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 “I think, therefore I am” (Cogito, ergo sum) suggests a “naïve” interpretation whereby 
anyone who argues as follows is certain of their existence. 
I think. 
Therefore, I am. 
 
Curiously, the famous line doesn’t appear in the Meditations, while it does in Descartes’ other 
works. Does the naïve interpretation, while a plausible reading of the other works, misread the 
Meditations? In this thesis, I claim that the Meditations should be naïvely interpreted by 
defending this position against three central objections.   
 Objection 1: Nowhere in the Meditations does the meditator assert that cogito is certain. I 
respond that the meditator does assert the certainty of cogito in the first meditation as he doubts 
his beliefs. This happens when he makes judgments about what he is thinking such as: “I have no 
answer to these [skeptical] arguments” and “my habitual opinions keep coming back.”  
 Objection 2: Even if the meditator claims cogito in the Meditations, he never accounts for 
why cogito is certain, which he must do if he uses it as a premise. I show that an argument for 
the certainty of cogito can be reconstructed by examining how the meditator doubts his beliefs. 
The idea behind the argument is that for the meditator to doubt his belief system it’s necessary 
that he is certain that he thinks, in particular, that he is certain about what his beliefs are and their 
amenability to doubt. In short, the certainty of cogito is built into the method of doubt.   
 Objection 3: The naïve interpretation of the Meditations is false since Descartes says that 
the cogito is not an argument. For, he says that the cogito is a “simple intuition of the mind”, not 
a “deduction by means of syllogism.” I respond that Descartes is not denying that the cogito is an 
argument. He is specifying the type of reasoning process one must use to work through the 
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A Note on Translation and Citation 
 
 
In this thesis, all citations of Descartes will be doubly cited. The first citation is from Collected 
Works, a compendium of Descartes’ oeuvre assembled by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery 
(“AT”). This is followed by a citation from The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, an English 
translation by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny 
(“CSMK”).  
I will almost exclusively quote the CSMK translation of Descartes’s writings. In several 
places in which the textual analysis is more exacting, I will quote the Latin from AT.  
For brevity’s sake, in-text references to secondary literature will be limited to a page 
number closed by parenthesis. If I cite multiple works by one commentator, the year of 
publication is included in the in-text citation. Full citations are found in the bibliography, 
formatted in MLA 7.  
 
 









Famous quotes, as they become famous, sometimes get dislodged from where they were 
first said. This is true in the work of Descartes. “I think, therefore I am” is not stated in the 
Meditations, what is now Descartes’ most widely read work. It does show up, though, in 
the Discourse on Method and the Principles of Philosophy. So, many who read the 
Meditations for the first time, often familiar with Descartes’ most famous saying, are as 
surprised by its absence as scholars are eager to point out the aberration.  
But what are we to make of the gap? At several junctures in the Meditations, the 
meditator makes claims about his thoughts, his existence, and their relations, most notably 
at the beginning of the second meditation (AT VII 24-25; CSMK 2:16-17). In the 
Meditations, did Descartes refine, or even omit entirely, the philosophical insight expressed 
by “I think, therefore I am”? The overarching claim of my thesis is “no.” Descartes neither 
omitted nor significantly refined the philosophical insight expressed by “I think, therefore I 
am” in the Meditations.  
Shortly, I will state three central objections I will respond to in order to support my 
overarching claim that there is no “cogito gap” between the Discourse and the Principles, 
on the one hand, and the Meditations, on the other. However, first I must explain what 
philosophical insight Descartes is communicating with his famous saying.  
To draw out the philosophical insight, I will follow Margaret Wilson, who offers a 
“naïve” interpretation of the famous saying (50-71). Although Wilson doesn’t mention it 





merely by considering the saying “I think, therefore I am” in isolation of the contexts in the 
Discourse and the Principles where Descartes asserts it.  
On the naïve reading, the meditator of the Meditations is presenting an argument. 
This is suggested by the phrase “therefore” (ergo). The argument establishes that the 
meditator is certain that he exists. The argument is this.  
I think. 
Therefore, I am. 
 
Suppose, for expository purposes, that I’m deploying this argument. The premise of the 
argument—I think—is something I’m certain of. I’m also certain that my existence follows 
from the fact that I think. From these two pieces, I infer the conclusion that I exist. And 
when I make this argument I become certain that I exist, since the conclusion is established 
by a certain premise and a certain logical entailment between the premise and the 
conclusion. Anyone else can make this argument, and so be certain that she too exists. A 
few clarifications should be made about the naïve argument to avoid confusion.  
 First, a note about the meaning of the premise “I think” (cogito). As I will use the 
term, when someone judges “I think”, or uses “I think” as a premise in an argument, she is 
saying that there is some thought currently going on in her mind or, as is now common 
parlance, she is in some mental state. So, when someone judges “I think” or uses “I think” 
as a premise, I will say that she is making a “second-order judgment.” A second-order 
judgment is a judgment about one’s own mental state rather than a “first-order judgment”, 
which is only about some worldly content. “It will rain” is a first-order judgment whereas 
“I believe that it will rain” is a second-order judgment. Crucially, on my usage, when 
someone judges “I think” they could be referring to any first-order mental state that they 





belief that it’s raining, their (first-order) state of imagining that it’s raining, or that they are 
having a generic (first-order) thought. For someone to claim “I think”—cogito—is for that 
person to judge that they are in some first-order mental state, whatever it may be.  
I believe this broad definition of cogito is how Descartes understood the term. 
Descartes widely defines thought (cogitatio) as: 
Everything that is within us in such a way that we are immediately aware of it. Thus 
all operations of the will, the intellect, the imagination and the senses are thoughts. I 
say ‘immediately’ so as to include the consequences of thoughts; a voluntary 
movement, for example, originates in a thought but is not itself a thought. (AT VII 
160; CSMK 2:113) 
 
Descartes also identifies “operations of the will, the intellect, the imagination and the 
senses” with attitudes such as doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, willing, 
unwilling, imagining, and having sensory perceptions (AT VII 28; CSMK 2:19). Given 
Descartes’ broad definition of thought, when someone judges “I think”, they are referring 
to any of their current first-order mental states of doubting that such and such, of 
understanding that such and such, of just thinking (in a generic, unspecified sense), and so 
on.1  
The reason I have specified that, on my usage, the judgment “I think” may report 
some first-order mental state that is not stated by the proposition “I think” is that there are 
alternative interpretations of the cogito2 that understand the proposition cogito—“I think”—
                                                      
1 Descartes’ letter from March 1638 (AT II 37) is additional evidence that he understands 
the judgment that “I think” to be a second-order judgment about one’s first-order mental 
life. In the letter, Descartes says that to make the argument “I have the opinion that I am 
breathing, therefore I am” is “just the same as” arguing “I am thinking, therefore I am.” He 
then goes on to say that “all the other propositions [e.g. “I have the opinion that I am 
breathing”] from which we can conclude our existence come back to this one [cogito].” 
2 Following standard convention in Descartes scholarship, when I write “the cogito” 





differently. On this other picture, “I think” is the sort of proposition that is made true just 
by my judging it. In this way, “I think” shares something special with other propositions 
such as: “This is a statement of my resignation” and “I judge that you are the winner.” 
Perhaps one way of expressing what these propositions have in common is that, in the 
contexts in which they are asserted, they are guaranteed to be true. If someone genuinely 
asserts one of these propositions and understands what she is asserting, then the proposition 
must be true. Burge (92) and Williams (59) call these propositions “self-verifying.” It might 
be thought that since the proposition “I think” is self-verifying in this sort of way, it follows 
that “I think” is also certain. Williams (59) considers an argument along these lines. I will 
not attempt to illuminate the nature of self-verifying propositions, how “I think” may be 
self-verifying, and how this connects to the certitude of “I think.” I only bring this up to 
clarify that on my use of “I think”, it doesn’t express a self-verifying proposition since 
when I judge “I think”, I may be referring to some first-order mental state, like my first-
order desire for chocolate, which is not in the content of “I think.”3 I have also presented 
some evidence on the previous page that Descartes understood the proposition “I think”—
cogito—as I do.  
                                                      
convenient way of referring to Descartes’ discussion of his first principle across his later 
writings.  
3 Perhaps the self-verifying reading of cogito is best brought out when cogito is translated 
as “I am thinking”, rather than “I think” (the former version is how the CSMK translation 
renders it in the Discourse. See CSMK 1:127). The proposition “I am thinking” may appear 
to have an active, self-referential quality that is central to the notion of self-verification. 
Perhaps the most famous discussion of self-verification and the cogito occurs in Hintikka 
(14-18), who was predominantly interested in the self-verifying properties of uttering “I 
exist” (rather than “I think”, which is my focus in this thesis). He also seems to have meant 
something different by “self-verifying” than Williams and Burge—Hintikka’s usage 
concerns, as I understand him, the pragmatic properties of asserting the proposition “I 





A second clarification is that on the naïve interpretation, the meditator concludes 
that he exists by doing more than judging himself to be in some first-order mental state. 
The meditator is also judging that his existence is entailed by the fact that he is thinking. 
Many questions arise here. For example, in meditator’s argument, is it necessary that he 
marks out the fact that he thinks entails that he exists as a separate premise from cogito in 
order to become certain that he exists? Or, is concluding sum on the basis of cogito 
enough? Does the meditator need to recognize that the fact that he thinks entails that he 
exists is an instance of a more general principle such as “Whatever thinks exists”? Why is it 
true that my thinking entails my existence? I will put off these questions until the third 
chapter of my thesis where I will examine how Descartes begins to answer these questions. 
The naïve interpretation is neutral about the answers to these questions.   
Third, note that in the naïve argument, the meditator doesn’t need to judge “I think 
is certain” to become certain of his existence. In other words, the premise doesn’t need to 
be: “It is certain that I think.” Relatedly, the conclusion doesn’t have to include certainty. 
The reason why is that, as we will soon see, the meditator accepts, as a tenet of his method 
of doubt, that he should only make judgments that are certain. Thus, it’s implied that the 
premise and conclusion are things of which the meditator believes to be certain, in addition 
to being true.4   
 Fourth, the naïve argument doesn’t establish that the reasoner persists, or exists for 
any period except for the instant at which she is certain that she thinks. So, a completely 
accurate version of the naïve argument would have the premise and conclusion indexed to 
the exact same time.  
                                                      





 My thesis argues for the naïve interpretation of the Meditations by responding to 
three central objections. 
 In the first chapter, I take up the objection that the naïve interpretation is incorrect 
since nowhere in the text of the Meditations does the meditator judge cogito. That is, 
nowhere does the meditator make a certain categorical second-order judgment. I argue that 
the meditator does make categorical second-order judgments that he regards as certain in 
the first meditation when he makes remarks such as “I have no answer to these arguments 
[the skeptical arguments]” and “my habitual opinions keep coming back, and despite my 
wishes, they capture my belief” (AT VII 21-22; CSMK 2:14-15). I go on to argue that in 
the first meditation, by engaging in the process of doubting his first-order beliefs, the 
meditator is committed to the Certainty of Mind Thesis (“CM”), the view that all his 
second-order judgments are certain. Surprisingly, then, the meditator has some certainty 
even in the first meditation. I close by arguing that when the meditator begins the second 
meditation, he uses these second-order judgments as a premise in his argument for sum.  
 In the second chapter, I respond to the objection that if the meditator were to derive 
sum from certain second-order judgements (which is what the naïve interpretation claims), 
then the mediator should provide an account of why his second-order judgments are certain, 
but he lacks such an account. I argue that an argument for the Certainty of Mind Thesis can 
be reconstructed in the first meditation that bears resemblance to an argument developed by 
Tyler Burge. The general idea behind the argument is that the meditator’s process of doubt 
requires certain second-order judgments. The meditator must be able to be certain about the 
structure and substance of his (first-order) belief system. He also must have certain second-





arguments and determine when he has completed the project of doubting his beliefs. In 
short, certain higher-order judgments are built into the method of doubt.  
 The connecting theme of chapters one and two is that a close look at the first 
meditation, particularly the role of reflection in the method of doubt, provides novel 
responses to two central problems for the naïve interpretation. It turns out that cogito, the 
premise of the meditator’s argument for his existence, is claimed in the first meditation. 
Also, we will see that in the first meditation the meditator has an argument available to him 
that establishes the certainty of cogito and more generally the certainty of the access he has 
over his own mind.  
 In the third chapter, I examine the objection that the cogito is not an argument at all. 
This objection emerges not from the text of the Meditations but from passages in the 
Objections and Replies to the Meditations as well as Descartes’ Conversation with Burman. 
For example, in one of the passages Descartes says: “When someone says ‘I am thinking, 
therefore I am, or I exist’, he does not deduce existence from thought by means of a 
syllogism, but recognizes it as something self-evident by a simple intuition of the mind” 
(AT VII 140-141; CSMK 2:100). I argue that Descartes here is not denying that the cogito 
is an argument. Rather, he is specifying the type of process by which someone must reason 
through the argument from cogito to sum—sum is discovered by what he calls “intuition” 
rather than syllogistic reasoning. To defuse the tension, I examine Descartes’ account of 
various types of reasoning—intuition, deduction, and syllogism—present in one of his 










What is the earliest place in the Meditations where the meditator is certain of something? 
It’s tempting to think that there is a clear answer to this question. The tempting answer is 
that the meditator waits until the third paragraph of the second meditation to consider what 
is beyond doubt.5 There, he presents an argument for, or, more modestly, considers the 
certainty of his thoughts, existence, and/or their relations. Call this reading—that the 
meditator waits until the second meditation to begin his positive quest for certainty rather 
than what is uncertain—the “traditional” reading.     
The traditional reading is plausible on a first read. Evidence for the traditional 
reading can be found by comparing the titles of the first and second meditations. The title 
of the first is “What can be called into doubt”, whereas the title of the second is “The nature 
of the human mind, and how it is better known than the body.”  
 In this section, I will argue that this traditional reading is false, though made very 
enticing by how the meditator appears to alert the reader to where his positive epistemology 
begins. A close reexamination of the end of the first meditation will reveal that the 
meditator, at this early stage, holds that more than several of his thoughts are certain, and 
relies on this claim to argue for the certitude of his existence. In light of this reexamination, 
we should adopt the revisionary reading that the first meditation is the starting point of the 
meditator’s argument for the certainty of his existence. So, generalizing this point, it’s also 
the starting point of his positive quest for certainty.  
                                                      





My motivation for pitching this interpretive shift is to defend the naïve reading of 
the Meditations. The naïve interpretation says that the meditator advances an argument of 
the form:  
I think 
Therefore, I am 
 
The naïve interpretation faces a simple textual objection: nowhere in the text of the 
Meditations does the meditator categorically assert that “I think” is certain, or that any of 
his second-order thoughts are certain. So, it’s wrong to read the meditator as making the 
argument represented above. As I will soon explain, the force of this simple textual 
objection depends, falsely in my view, on considering the second meditation as the starting 
point for the meditator’s positive search for certainty.  
Harry Frankfurt makes this objection in Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen, his 
famous commentary on the Meditations. “If the peculiar value of deriving sum from cogito 
actually consisted in the certitude of cogito,” he writes, “Descartes ought to establish or at 
least to claim that cogito is in fact a statement of which he is certain. He does not do so” 
(111). In agreement with Frankfurt, Janet Broughton calls the fact that the meditator never 
asserts the certainty of his thoughts in the second meditation a “puzzle” that seriously 
undermines the naïve interpretation (2008, 182-183). 
 Before I explain why the traditional reading is mistaken, let us see why it’s so 
tantalizing. Consider the subheading of the first meditation: “What can be called into 
doubt” (AT VII 17; CSMK 2:12). That makes it sound as though the meditator is not 
setting out, just yet, to find what is certain and indubitable. Rather, the task of the first 
meditation is to discover what can be doubted. Indeed, the meditator’s sustained 





his beliefs to doubt. Furthermore, Descartes intends for the skeptical arguments, the levers 
of his project of doubt, to be the principal focus of the first meditation. Indeed, in the 
Second Replies, he says that he intends readers to “devote several months, or at least 
weeks” to the skeptical arguments before going on to the rest of the book (AT VII 130; 
CSMK 2:94).  
 The meditator also seems to be very explicit that the second meditation is where he 
will begin to uncover beliefs that are certain. Midway through the first paragraph of the 
second meditation he says: 
Anything which admits of the slightest doubt I will set aside just as if I had found it 
to be wholly false; and I will proceed in this way until I recognize something certain, 
or, if nothing else, until I at least recognize for certain that this is no certainty. (AT 
VII 24; CSMK 2:16)  
 
An implication of this appears be that he has not at this point in the text, or previously, 
found anything certain. Shortly, I will explain why such a conclusion would be a mistake—
the meditator does find certain beliefs in the first meditation.  
The traditional reading holds that it’s not until the third paragraph of the second 
meditation, that the meditator discovers a certain belief of some sort. Because of the way 
the meditator, in what was just quoted, appears to mark out the third paragraph as the place 
in which he will discover the first thing he is certain of, the “Archimedean point” (ibid), 
many think that the third paragraph is the authoritative passage on Descartes’ views about 
the relation of cogito and sum. This is the passage: 
Yet apart from everything I have just listed, how do I know that there is nothing else 
which does not allow even the slightest occasion for doubt? Is there not a God, or 
whatever I may call him, who puts into me the thoughts I am now having? But why 
do I think this, since I myself may perhaps be the author of my thoughts. In that case 
am not I, at least, something? But I have just said that I have no senses and no body. 
This is the sticking point: what follows from this? Am I not so bound up with a body 





there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does 
it now follow that I too do not exist? No: if I convinced myself of something then I 
certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is 
deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is 
deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about 
that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So after considering 
everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I 
exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind. 
(AT VII 24-25; CSMK 2:16-17. Italics are Descartes) 
 
Of the passage, Frankfurt writes: 
The statement, I think, therefore I am, simply does not occur in the passage at all; and 
neither does any exactly equivalent statement. In fact, the cogito as such does not 
appear anywhere in the Meditations. I propose to take Descartes’s text on its own 
terms and to approach it without preconceptions based on the speculation that cogito 
ergo sum adequately formulates its meaning. (Frankfurt, 92, italics are Frankfurt’s). 
 
In the end, I think there is something correct in Frankfurt’s remark. In the passage, there is 
no point at which Descartes asserts verbatim “I think, therefore I am.”  
However, at the least, the meditator is asserting that several of his thoughts entail 
that he exists. I will point out four of these entailments.  
First, the line, “No: if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed.”6 
seems equivalent to: 
(1) If I convinced myself of something, then I certainly existed. 
The next two sentences are a little trickier to interpret, both because the first sentence starts 
with “but” (sed) and because the first half of the second sentence, the clause that ends with 
the semicolon, seems more germane to the first sentence—showing something that follows 
from what is being supposed in the first—rather than the second sentence, which expresses 
a slightly different claim.  
But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and 
constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; 
                                                      





and let him deceive me as much as he case, he will never bring it about that I am 
nothing so long as I think that I am something. (AT VII 25; CSMK 2:17)7 
 
Note that the “but” that begins these sentences plays the role of introducing 
considerations—a supposed evil demon—that is claimed to bear on the truth of (1). Thus, 
the first sentence and the second sentence up until the semicolon don’t express a new 
entailment of the form: “If I am deceived by a powerful and cunning deceiver, then I 
undoubtedly exist.” What they express is a slightly modified version of (1):  
(2) If I convince myself of something, then I certainly exist, even if I am being 
deceived.8  
 
Moreover, the remainder of the second sentence can be rendered:  
(3) If I think that I am something, then indubitably I exist. 
And the final sentence, the “conclusion” Descartes reaches after “considering everything 
very thoroughly”9 might be read as  
(4) If I conceive of or put forward the proposition “I exist” in my mind, then I exist. 
Before I move on, I wish to say why the traditional reading makes the naïve 
interpretation looks so unpromising. Recall that on the naïve interpretation the meditator 
establishes that he exists with certainty by inferring this from the premise “I think”, which 
he regards as certain, and, as I understand Descartes’ usage of “I think”, it’s equivalent to 
                                                      
7 “Sed est deceptor nescio quis, summe potens, summe callidus, qui de industriâ me semper 
fallit. Haud dubie igitur ego etiam sum, si me fallit; & fallat quantum potest, nunquam 
tamen efficiet, ut nihil sim quamdiu me aliquid esse cogitabo.” 
8A subtlety about the past/present tense: if my reading of (2) as being a modification of (1) 
in the way described is correct, it seems plausible that Descartes would have allowed (1) to 
be rewritten in the present tense, since the two sentences that begin with “But” are 
themselves in the present tense. This point about tense is significant because “I think, 
therefore I am” is in the present tense. 
9 “Adeo ut, omnibus satis superque pensitatis, denique statuendum sit hoc pronuntiatum, 





any second-order judgment such as “I’m thinking about my dog” or “I don’t believe in 
ghosts.” If this paragraph at AT VII 24-25; CSMK 2:16-17 is the focus point for 
deciphering Descartes’ views on the relation between “I think” and “I exist”, then he only 
asserts the four distilled entailments, each a species of the genus “If I think, I exist.” This 
creates a stumbling block—a “puzzle” as Broughton puts it (2008, 182-183)—for the naïve 
interpretation, since nowhere therein does the meditator assert the antecedents of any of the 
four entailments.  
The common response by defenders of the naïve interpretation to this puzzle is to 
try to find some later point in the text of the Meditations or in The Objections and Replies 
where Descartes does asserts that his thoughts are certain. In what follows, I review the 
passages that some adherents of the naïve interpretation cite as evidence of a statement by 
Descartes that his thoughts are certain. Then, I will say why this textual strategy to defend 
the naïve interpretation is inadequate. This will motivate my presentation of a new strategy 
that defends the naïve interpretation by looking to the first meditation.  
The first source of evidence presented by adherents of the naïve interpretation to 
show that Descartes does assert “I think” with certainty comes from passages that come 
after the third paragraph of the second meditation. Perhaps the most favorable of these is a 
section emphasized by Bernard Williams (63-64) and Margaret Wilson (59) that occurs 
near the end of the second meditation. The section comes at the point where the meditator 
is concluding his investigation into the nature of the ‘I’ and is about to proceed to the wax. 
The most relevant sentences are italicized.  
But what then am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, 






This is a considerable list, if everything on it belongs to me. But does it? Is it 
not one and the same 'I' who is now doubting almost everything, who nonetheless 
understands some things, who affirms that this one thing is true, denies everything 
else, desires to know more, is unwilling to be deceived, imagines many things even 
involuntarily, and is aware of many things which apparently come from the senses? 
Are not all these things just as true as the fact that I exist, even if I am asleep all the 
time, and even if he who created me is doing all he can to deceive me? Which of all 
these activities is distinct from my thinking? Which of them can be said to be 
separate from myself? The fact that it is I who am doubting and understanding and 
willing is so evident that I see no way of making it any clearer. But it is also the case 
that the 'I' who imagines is the same 'I'. For even if, as I have supposed, none of the 
objects of imagination are real, the power of imagination is something which really 
exists and is part of my thinking. Lastly, it is also the same 'I' who has sensory 
perceptions, or is aware of bodily things as it were through the senses. For example, I 
am now seeing light, hearing a noise, feeling heat. But I am asleep, so all this is false. 
Yet I certainly seem to see, to hear, and to be warmed. This cannot be false; what is 
called 'having a sensory perception' is strictly just this, and in this restricted sense of 
the term it is simply thinking. (AT VII 28-29; CSMK 2:19) 
 
I will refrain from investigating whether either of these sentences are equivalent to, or 
imply, an assertion that the meditator’s second-order thoughts are certain. Even if the 
meditator is asserting that his second-order thoughts are certain, the underlying strategy to 
defend the naïve interpretation by citing assertions that come after the beginning of the 
second meditation is inconsistent with the order of discovery in the Meditations. Descartes 
makes it clear in the Second Objections and Replies that there is a strict sequence of 
argumentation in the Meditations: 
The order consists simply in this. The items which are put forward first must be 
known entirely without the aid of what comes later; and the remaining items must be 
arranged in such a way that their demonstration depends solely on what has gone 
before. I did try to follow this order very carefully in my Meditations, and my 
adherence to it was the reason for my dealing with the distinction between the mind 
and the body only at the end, in the Sixth Meditation, rather than in the Second. It 
also explains why I deliberately and knowingly omitted many matters which would 







Since Descartes is explicit that he doesn’t intend for things established at later stages to be 
parts of arguments for claims made earlier on, it would be illicit for the possible assertions 
within AT VII 28-29; CSMK 2:19 to be counted as components of an argument for the 
certainty of his existence. Notice: AT VII 28-29; CSMK 2:19 occurs after the meditator 
concludes his argument for the certainty of his existence. The change from arguing for his 
existence to examining the nature of his existence is implied by the transition sentence that 
comes directly after the third paragraph of the second meditation: “But I do not have a 
sufficient understanding of what this ‘I’ is that now necessarily exists” (AT VII 25; CSMK 
2:17). That these two matters—establishing his existence and inquiring into the nature of 
his existence—are different issues and are taken up sequentially is further confirmed in 
Descartes’ gloss of the second meditation in the Synopsis (AT VII 12-13; CSMK 2:9).  
A somewhat more compelling defense of the naïve interpretation is to highlight 
passages from the Objections and Replies in which Descartes attempts to clarify the 
argument for sum made in the Meditations. The most promising of these passages is a 
response that Descartes makes to one of Gassendi’s objections. There, I read Descartes as 
claiming that any second-order judgment about one’s first-order thoughts is completely 
certain and so it can be used as a premise to infer the certainty of sum.  
Gassendi’s objection is that the meditator didn’t need “all this apparatus” of putting 
forward, or conceiving of, the proposition “I exist” to “conclude” that he exists—the 
meditator “could have made the same inference from any one of [his] other actions, since it 
is known by the natural light that whatever acts exists” (AT VII 258-259; CSMK 2:180).  
Below is Descartes’ response. I draw the reader’s attention to two points. (1) 





any second-order order judgment will serve a premise in an argument for the certainty of 
sum since our second-order judgments are completely certain.  
Again, what reason have you for saying that I 'did not need all this apparatus' to prove 
I existed? These very words of yours surely show that I have the best reason to think 
that I have not used enough apparatus, since I have not yet managed to make you 
understand the matter correctly. When you say that I 'could have made the same 
inference from any one of my other actions' you are far from the truth, since I am not 
wholly certain of any of my actions, with the sole exception of thought (in using the 
word 'certain' I am referring to metaphysical certainty, which is the sole issue at this 
point). I may not, for example, make the inference 'I am walking, therefore I exist', 
except in so far as the awareness of walking is a thought. The inference is certain 
only if applied to this awareness, and not to the movement of the body which 
sometimes - in the case of dreams - is not occurring at all, despite the fact that I seem 
to myself to be walking. Hence from the fact that I think I am walking I can very well 
infer the existence of a mind which has this thought, but not the existence of a body 
that walks. And the same applies in other cases. (AT VII 352; CSMK 2:243-244) 
 
Here, Descartes does plainly assert that a second-order judgment such as “I think I am 
walking” is certain.10 Still, one might find this way of defending the naïve interpretation 
objectionable. According to Frankfurt (10), to emphasize that Descartes accepts the 
naïve reading in his response to Gassendi is to admit that there is a “serious gap” in the 
meditator’s discussion of sum in the third paragraph of the second meditation, at AT VII 
24-25; CSMK 2:16-17. There, the meditator doesn’t make certain second-order 
judgments; he doesn’t assert cogito.  
Frankfurt’s objection seems to be this. Defenders of the naïve interpretation wish 
to read Descartes’ response to Gassendi, in which Descartes argues for the certainty of 
sum just as the naïve interpretation says, as Descartes’ real account of the cogito. But 
                                                      
10 Of course, “second-order judgment” is not Descartes’ terminology. In the introduction, I 
explained how and why this terminology is used. Descartes here is credibly read as 
implying that “I think I am walking” is a second-order judgment since he refers to “I think I 
am walking” as a “fact” and suggests it may serve as a premise in the argument for sum 





this account of the cogito differs from the meditator’s account in the second meditation, 
where an assertion of cogito is not to be found. Thus, defenders of the naïve 
interpretation who emphasize Descartes’ response to Gassendi must portray the 
meditator as launching an invalid argument for the certainty of sum in the second 
meditation. Interpreting the meditator as making an invalid argument is unacceptable. If 
this counter objection to an emphasis on Descartes’ response to Gassendi is merited, 
then the naïve interpretation still lacks a cogent response to Frankfurt’s initial textual 
objection that the meditator doesn’t assert cogito in the text of the Meditations.  
 Where are we? The traditional reading holds that the meditator commences his 
inquiry into what is certain in the third paragraph of the second meditation, at AT VII 25-
25; CSMK 2:16-17. There, the meditator mounts some argument concerning the certainty 
of sum and its relation to cogito. The traditional reading is very hard to reconcile with the 
central conviction of the naïve interpretation that the meditator establishes the certainty of 
his existence by deriving that conclusion from a certain judgment he makes about his own 
mind. This is because, as we have seen, the evidence presented by adherents of the naïve 
interpretation that Descartes makes certain second-order judgments elsewhere—either at 
some later part of the Meditations or in the Objections and Replies—is unsatisfactory. What 
is left in the Meditations when read traditionally are scraps of the naïve argument: the if-
then statements I extracted from AT VII 24-25; CSMK 2:16-17, which are in some sense 
more particular versions of the proposition “If I think, then I exist,” and the conclusion, as 
Descartes seems to put it, that “this ‘I’ now necessarily exists” (ibid). The missing piece is 
some assertion made by the meditator that he thinks, or at least of the thoughts that occur as 





 The missing pieces, although elusive, can be found at the end of the first meditation 
(AT VII 21-22; CSMK 2:14-15). A quick roadmap of the end of the first meditation might 
proceed as follows. After presenting the dreamer argument, which calls into doubt beliefs 
about the external world, the meditator begins to present a skeptical argument based on the 
possibility of a deceptive God. This argument would call an even wider class of beliefs into 
doubt including, but not limited to, arithmetical and geometrical beliefs, “transparent 
truths,” and beliefs that appear to be “perfect knowledge” (ibid). Next, the meditator 
formulates an atheist-friendly version of this argument based not on the idea that God may 
be massively deceptive, but that our beliefs are arrived at by “fate or chance or a continuous 
chain of events,” processes liable to “deception and error.” At this point, the meditator 
realizes that his “former” beliefs have been cast into doubt. He resolves not to assent to any 
of them, as hard as that may be, but to “deceive” himself into “pretending” that all his 
former beliefs are “false and imaginary.” To make it easier to deceive himself into thinking 
that all his former beliefs are false and imaginary (rather than “reasonable to believe,” as he 
seems to think they really are), he tinkers with the skeptical argument based on the 
possibility of a deceptive God. A “malicious demon of the utmost power and cunning” 
replaces God as the master of deception. The force of this argument leaves the meditator 
suspended in doubt “like a prisoner enjoying imaginary freedom.” 
 The section critical for building my fresh defense of the naïve interpretation is after 
the skeptical argument intended for atheists but before the tinkered evil demon argument—
from where the meditator appraises the force of the skeptical arguments continuing through 
his resolution to pretend that all his former beliefs are false and imaginary. This section 





thought that it contains little else save for some insight into the method of doubt of the 
Meditations: that doubts must be based on powerful and well-thought out reasons; that the 
main rule of his method of doubt is that assent should be withheld from any doubtable 
beliefs; that a successful undertaking of the method of doubt requires, because of 
weaknesses of the human mind, some self-deception. 
 There is more going on. While the meditator is articulating his method of doubt, he 
is also asserting, with certainty, that he is having a great number of his thoughts pertaining 
to his project of doubting his former beliefs. These second-order assertions should be 
understood as the premises that make up the meditator’s arguments for the certainty of his 
existence. To illustrate this, take the first sentence of the section we are considering: 
I have no answer to these arguments, but am finally compelled to admit that there is 
not one of my former beliefs about which a doubt may not properly be raised; and 
this is not a flippant or ill-considered conclusion, but is based on powerful and well 
thought-out reasons. (AT VII 21-22; CSMK 2:14-15).  
 
The meditator is doing nothing less than making second-order judgements about his 
first-order former beliefs and first-order mental life more generally. The meditator 
makes the following second-order judgments about his first-order mental states and 
activities:   
(5) I have no answer to these arguments.  
(6) I have successfully doubted all my former beliefs. 
(7) I have doubted my former beliefs on the basis of powerful and well thought-out 
reasons. 
 
That is not all. In the subsequent sentences, he makes more claims about his first-order 
mental activities. A few examples are: 
(8) I must withhold assent, in the next meditation, from my former beliefs. 
(9) I must remember to withhold assent, in the next meditation, from my former beliefs.  





(11) It is a good plan to deceive myself into pretending my former opinions are false and 
imaginary.  
 
And the assertions continue. At the very end of the first meditation, as he is reacting to the 
refined evil demon argument, the meditator also makes claims about other first-order 
mental states of his, such as being in a state of “dread” for subjecting old comfortable 
opinions to doubt and “fear” of having to laboriously use his reason to find indubitable 
beliefs, possibly without success.  
The issue we have been concerned with over the last several pages is whether the 
meditator makes any second-order judgment about his first-order mental life. If the 
meditator makes a second-order judgment that he regards as certain, this would obviate 
Frankfurt’s objection that the meditator should not be read as concluding the certainty of 
sum from the certainty of cogito because the meditator never asserts cogito with certainty. 
That is, he never makes a certain second-order judgment. Now, we have seen that the 
meditator does makes several second-order judgments during his procedure of doubting his 
first-order beliefs. Soon, I will explain why the meditator also regards these second-order 
judgments as certain. My response to Frankfurt’s objection will also show that the 
traditional reading is mistaken: the meditator’s argument for his existence begins in the first 
meditations, at AT VII 21-22; CSMK 2:14-15.  
A virtue of my reading is that it bolsters the plausibility of the naïve interpretation 
while understanding the meditator as arguing for his existence in an orderly sequence. The 
sequence starts with various thoughts being asserted in the first meditation, then various 
thoughts are asserted to entail sum at the third paragraph of the second meditation, and 
finally sum is concluded at the very beginning of the fourth paragraph of the second 





with me that the naïve interpretation is correct, rely on textual evidence that the meditator 
asserts cogito after he concludes sum. This is weak evidence because it portrays the 
meditator as arguing in a disorderly, disorganized fashion, drawing conclusions from 
premises that are only stated ex post facto. Such an interpretation would have left Descartes 
himself quite unsatisfied, given his remarks about the order of discovery we have seen from 
the Second Objections and Replies.  
I turn now to three objections to reading the meditator as commencing his argument 
for the certainty of his existence in the first meditation. 
The first objection is that for the meditator to draw his conclusion that he is certain 
of his existence, he must assert that his thoughts are certain. However, goes the objection, 
in the passages I have cited the meditator makes assertions about several of his thoughts, 
but doesn’t regard these assertions as certain. He merely states, “my habitual opinions are 
coming back” (AT VII 22; CSMK 2:15) not “Certainly, my habitual opinions are coming 
back.” Perhaps the meditator is making these higher-order assertions as uncertain, 
reasonable conjectures about what is going on in his mind.  
There are two pieces of evidence that show that the meditator regards his second-
order judgments about his thoughts as certain. The first can be gleaned from a line that 
reveals the central tenet of the method of doubt in the Meditations. At the very beginning of 
the first meditation, the meditator says, “Reason now leads me to think that I should hold 
back my assent from opinions which are not completely certain and indubitable just as 
carefully as I do from those which are patently false” (AT VII 18; CSMK 2:12). What this 
comes down to is a norm or constraint regarding what should be asserted (and by that token 





individual who wishes to engage in the method of doubt. The constraint is a negative one: 
do not assert to what can be doubted, even ever so slightly. Yet, since the meditator also 
champions a constructive side of his project, one of establishing in the sciences what is 
“stable” and “likely to last” (ibid) and what it certain, it’s plausible that the meditator 
accepts the positive version of the rule of doubt: assert what is certain, that which cannot be 
doubted at all. Thus, we should expect that whenever the meditator, always didactically 
obedient to the method of doubt, makes an assertion, he regards that assertion as certain.  
While it’s true that the meditator doesn’t always explicitly attach the word “certain” 
to every assertion he makes, the deviation is a matter of style, not substance. This can be 
seen at AT VII 21-22; CSMK 2:15-16, where the meditator sometimes expresses the 
entailments so that their consequents sometimes contain the word “certain” and sometimes 
don’t. His intermittent sprinkling of “certain” is immaterial, and included most likely to 
remind the reader that the meditator is obeying the rule of doubt, unlike in ordinary life, in 
which we sometimes assert things that we take to be true but uncertain.  
The second piece of text that shows the certainty in the meditator’s judgments 
during the first meditation is a passage we have already seen, Descartes’ response to 
Gassendi in the Fifth Set of Replies. There, Descartes says that “I am not certain of any of 
my actions, with the sole exception of thought” (AT VII 352; CSMK 2:244). He goes on to 
suggest that he can be certain of any of his thoughts, such as the thought or awareness that 
he is walking (ibid). Here, Descartes appears to commit himself to the thesis that all one’s 
second-order judgments are certain. Since Descartes is committed to this thesis about the 
certainty of mind, it would be inconsistent for him to hold that the meditator’s assertions 





 The second objection concedes that the meditator does regard the assertions he 
made about his mind in the first meditation as certain. The objection, however, is that the 
meditator doesn’t intend these certain assertions to be part of an argument to establish the 
certainty of sum. Since the meditator doesn’t characterize his assertions about his mind as 
premises in an argument for sum, it’s unlikely that the meditator, or Descartes, regarded 
them as serving as part of an argument for sum.  
A reply to this objection can be given by pointing out the remarkable similarities 
that exist between content of the meditator’s second-order judgments in the first meditation 
and the entailments the meditator states between thought and existence in the second 
meditation. The similarities suggest that the meditator did, at some level, intend the 
assertions made in the first meditation to a premise of the cogito argument. The most salient 
similarity is between the initial second-order judgement the meditator has in the first 
meditation:  
(5) I have no answer to these arguments (AT VII 21; CSMK 2:14) 
and the very first entailment claimed in the second meditation, at AT VII 25; CSMK 2:17, 
namely: 
(1) If I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed.  
In (5), when the meditator says that he has “no answer” to the skeptical arguments, he is 
saying that he can think of no objections to the skeptical arguments—they have convinced 
him that his beliefs are doubtable.11  
                                                      
11 The following is the full sentence from which (5) is translated; (5) is from the italicized 
first clause. Quibus sane argumentis non habeo quod respondeam, sed tandem cogor fateri 






The parallelism of the proposition in (5) and the antecedent of (1) gives us good 
reason to believe that the meditator intends them to make up an argument of the form: 
(1) I am convinced by the skeptical arguments. (5, rewritten from AT VII 21; CSMK 
2:14) 
(2) If I am convinced by something, then I exist. (1, rewritten from AT VII 25; CSMK 
2:17) 
(3) Therefore, I exist. (rewritten from AT VII 25; CSMK 2:17) 
 
That the meditator intends this pairing is also corroborated by scrupulously attending to his 
use of the past tense. The line from the second meditation that states the logical connection 
reads “No: if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed” (AT VII 25; CSMK 
2:17). It was in the first meditation that the meditator felt the force of the skeptical 
arguments and had no answer to them (i.e. was convinced), so the past tense phrasing 
should be taken as referring to the course of the first meditation, specifically to when the 
meditator reported being convinced by the skeptical arguments, as rendered in (5).  
While other argumentative pairings are less obvious than (1) and (5), I think this 
single striking similarity is enough to defuse the objection. If the meditator made a pairing 
with one of his second-order judgments12 and an if-then conditional, it’s plausible that the 
meditator regarded any of his second-order judgments as a potential premise in the naïve 
argument for sum. For example, it’s plausible that the meditator regarded the following as a 
sound argument using the meditator’s second-order judgment that his habitual opinions 
keep coming back even after he has doubted them, which I represented earlier as 
proposition (10). 
 
                                                      
12 “I am convinced by the skeptical arguments” is a second-order judgment because it’s a 
judgment about the first-order mental state of being convinced. Being convinced implies 





(1) My habitual opinions are coming back even after I doubted them.  
(2) If my habitual opinions keep coming back, then I exist. 
(3) Therefore, I exist.  
 
What might be true is that the meditator didn’t recognize or discover that claims like 
“I have no answer to these argument” are things he asserted with certainty in the first 
meditation—or could assert with certainty—until the second meditation, which begins with 
a summary of what skeptical intellectual activities previously have occurred. This point is 
bolstered by how the objective of the second meditation is described: “Anything which 
admits the slightest doubt I will set aside…I will proceed until I recognize something 
certain” (AT VII 24; CSMK 2:16, my italics). “Recognize” leaves open the possibility that 
the meditator makes certain second-order judgments in the first meditation, but didn’t 
recognize this and consider its philosophical import at that earlier time. Still, even if the 
meditator didn’t recognize until the second meditation that he made several certain second-
order judgments in the first meditation, this is not a compelling reason to hold that the 
meditator didn’t intend any of the judgments to be a premise in the argument for sum. He 
still intends any of them to serve as a premise, he just doesn’t form this intention until the 
second meditation. 
The third objection concedes that the meditator makes certain second-order 
assertions concerning several of his thoughts in the first meditation and that these assertions 
may be paired together with an if-then statement made in the second meditation to make up 
an argument for the certainty of sum. The objection maintains that if the meditator argued 
in this way, he wouldn’t establish the certainty of sum because he must rely on memory, 





that at the time the meditator concludes sum in the second meditation, he must recall an 
assertion he made back in the first meditation, which took place at an earlier time.  
This objection is correct in saying that if the naïve interpretation reads the meditator 
as using his memory to argue for the certainty of sum, then he would be unable to show the 
certainty of sum. Indeed, the meditator acknowledges that memory is open to doubt in the 
second paragraph of the second meditation. The meditator says that he will suppose that his 
memory tells him lies (AT VII 24; CSMK 2:16), presumably because his memorial beliefs 
are open to doubt. The objection is also correct that the first meditation occurs at an earlier 
time than the second meditation. In the first line of the second meditation, the meditator 
refers to the first meditation as “yesterday’s meditation” (ibid).  
In response to the objection, a further look at the beginning of the second meditation 
shows that the meditator doesn’t rely on memory because he continues to engage in the 
method of doubt through the first two paragraphs of the second meditation. The meditator 
likens his persisting state of doubt to a swimmer caught in a whirlpool and vows to “once 
more attempt the same path which I started on yesterday” (AT VII 24; CSMK 2:16). Since 
the meditator continues with his enterprise of doubt at the opening of the second 
meditation, he continues be in a reflective state of mind. He keeps on thinking about what is 
happening to his mind as he engages in doubt. At the beginning of the second meditation, 
the meditator has many of the same thoughts that he did at the end of the first meditation. 
For example, in the first paragraph of the second meditation, the meditator is found again 





he is convinced by the skeptical arguments in the third paragraph.13 In addition, in the third 
paragraph the meditator makes new judgments about his first-order mental life: he wonders 
whether God could have authored his first-order thoughts.  
Thus, while the meditator begins to make judgments about what is going on in his 
mind at the end of the first meditation, he continues to do so through the beginning of the 
second meditation. Strictly speaking, it’s the meditator’s second-order judgments from the 
very beginning of the second meditation that my reading holds are used in an argument for 
sum, since they occur at the same time as the meditator’s judgments about how various of 
these thoughts entail the certainty of sum. By noting that the meditator’s process of doubt 
and concomitant reflections on his belief system endures into the second meditation, we can 
see that the meditator continues to make second-order judgments about some of the same 
first-order thoughts as he did back in the first meditation. For this reason, the meditator 
doesn’t rely on memory when he concludes sum in the first sentence of the fourth 
paragraph. The naïve interpretation has it that the premise and conclusion of the argument 
for sum are indexed to the same time.14  
                                                      
13 Indeed, there are some thoughts that the meditator has in the first meditation, at AT VII 
22; CSMK 2:15, like “my habitual opinions keep coming back”, that he no longer has when 
he begins the second meditation at AT VII 23-24; CSMK 2:16. The reason he doesn’t 
continue to think that his former beliefs keep coming back by the start of the second 
meditation is that the final formulation of the demon argument presented in the last 
paragraph of the first meditation presumably was successful, and he completely stopped 
assenting to his former beliefs.  
14 One might further object that on my reading the two premises, “cogito” and “if cogito, 
then sum”, and the conclusion “sum” still cannot occur at the same time because the 
meditator asserts each premise and the conclusion in different sentences within the 
beginning of the second meditation. So, the different sentences suggest the inference is 
diachronic. As we will see in chapter three, Descartes understands the cogito to be inferred 
using a psychological process called “intuition” where the premises and conclusion of an 
argument can all be asserted and inferred in one mental grasp or a single “movement of 





In this chapter, my aim has been to defend the naïve interpretation of the cogito 
against the objection that the meditator doesn’t make categorical, certain assertions about 
his mental life. We have discovered that these certain assertions occur primarily at the end 
of the first meditation and continue into the second meditation. They arise as the meditator, 
a rational agent, takes on the intellectual project of subjecting his former beliefs to doubt. 
The intensity and rigor of the meditator’s enterprise of doubt leads him to reflect on his 
belief system, the extent to which he has thrown it into doubt, and what further steps he 
must take to complete his enterprise of doubt. My interpretive observation that the 
meditator does make certain categorical assertions about his mental life during his doubt 
and intends any of them to be a premise in an argument for the certainty of sum bolsters the 
plausibility that the meditator deploys the following argument: 
I think. 
Therefore, I am. 
 
 I will end by suggesting that the interpretive observation I have been stressing in 
this section—that as the meditator doubts his beliefs, he is simultaneously examining and 
judging his belief system with certainty—sheds light not only on how the meditator 
establishes sum but also on the general structure of the Meditations.    
 First, it’s an overgeneralization to think that the meditator’s positive quest for 
certainty begins in the second meditation and the meditator doesn’t form any certain beliefs 
in the first meditation. As the meditator quite clearly tells us on the first page, he intends 
the skeptical arguments to target a foundational belief (that is false, in his view) in a “basic 
                                                      
that the elements of the argument for sum occur in different sentences. For Descartes, if the 
conclusion can be intuited from the premises, as is the case in the cogito, then the premises 
and conclusion are indexed to the same time. A more in-depth discussion of intuition is in 





principle” that his sensory beliefs are “most true” (ibid). I bring this up to emphasize that at 
no point in the first meditation does the meditator say that he intends to target his 
judgments about his mental life. Neither does he consider a skeptical scenario in which his 
second-order judgments are false in the first meditation.15 It’s just the opposite. He forms 
new beliefs, second-order ones, such as the belief that he is convinced by the skeptical 
arguments and that he has successfully doubted all his former beliefs.16 The second-order 
beliefs fall outside the specter of doubt because they are an essential part of the enterprise 
of doubting. For the meditator to doubt all his former opinions, he must form reflective 
judgments to track the destruction of his former belief system. Indeed, he regards these 
reflective judgments as certain, as I have argued. So, the meditator discovers certainty in 
the first meditation, contrary to how it might be traditionally read.  
Second, the certainty in the meditator’s method of doubt shows that the meditator, 
as early as the first meditation, is committed to the view that we can be certain of our own 
mental life, or at least parts of it, whereas our beliefs about the external world are less 
certain. Gilbert Ryle, in his provocative book The Concept of Mind, says that Descartes, 
like many other philosophers, relies on this sort of view, the thesis that we have “Privileged 
Access” to our own minds: 
A mind has a twofold Privileged Access to its own doings, which makes its self-
knowledge superior in quality, as well as prior in genesis, to its grasp of other things. 
I may doubt the evidence of my senses but not the deliverances of consciousness or 
introspection. (137) 
                                                      
15 Wilson makes this point (59-60).  
16 It is helpful for my argument that the meditator often speaks of his “former” beliefs being 
cast into doubt. He specifies that it is his “former” beliefs that are doubted at four places in 
the first meditation (once at AT VII 18; CSMK 2:12 and three times at AT VII 22; CSMK 
2:15). The designation of “former” suggests that the new second-order beliefs, which he is 







While the view that we have “privileged access” to our minds was probably thought to be a 
Cartesian view before Ryle, it was Ryle who coined the now popularly used term in 
Descartes scholarship as well as within contemporary philosophy of mind and 
epistemology. Ryle also distilled the Privileged Access Thesis into two further theses, what 
many have called the “Infallibility Thesis” and “Omniscience Thesis” represented below.17 
Following Ryle, there has been significant debate among scholars whether Descartes really 
commits himself to these claims.  
Infallibility: If S makes the second-order judgment that she is in mental state M, S is 
in M. 
 
Omniscience: If S is in M, S believes that she is in M.  
 
According to the Infallibility Thesis, if you judge that you are in some mental state, 
that judgment is “exempt from error” as Ryle says (137). That is, it will always turn out to 
be true; you will always in fact be in the mental state that you self-ascribe. Since Ryle, 
many have attributed the Infallibility Thesis to Descartes, but some do not.18 
According to the Omniscience Thesis, if you are in some occurrent mental state, 
then you will believe that you are in it. As Ryle colorfully puts it, “a mind cannot help 
                                                      
17 Ryle doesn’t name them as such. See 136-138.   
18 Sometimes the Infallibility Thesis is called the Incorrigibility Thesis. For those who 
attribute infallibility to Descartes, see Ryle (140) Audi (91), Kenny (70-72), Vinci (10), 
McRae (57), Williams (70). Broughton (2008, 179) and Wilson (150-165) partly attribute 
the thesis to Descartes. Curley (170-193) and Newman (2) do not attribute the view to 
Descartes. I’m disregarding slight differences in formulations of the view between authors. 
Also, it’s usually specified in a more exact formulation of the infallibility claim that one’s 
self-attributions are infallible only if they are arrived at through an introspective process. 
This specification is made to preclude cases of false self-attributions of mental states 
arrived at via sense perception (i.e. forming a false belief about yourself by listening to a 





being constantly aware of all the supposed occupants of its private stage” (136). Again, 
there are a range of views on whether Descartes held the Omniscience Thesis.19 
Now that we have seen how the meditator makes certain second-order judgments 
about his mind and belief system as he engages in the method of doubt, we are in a better 
position to consider Descartes’ commitments to the Privileged Access Thesis in the 
Meditations. The meditator commits himself to the strong claim that he can make certain 
judgments about his first-order mental states, or at least those first-order mental states that 
are part of his enterprise of doubt. To be certain about X implies, among other things, that 
X is true. 20 So, the Certainty of Mind Thesis implies the Infallibility Thesis. Thus, there is 
good evidence that the meditator relies on the Infallibility Thesis in the first meditation.  
Scholars who believe that Descartes commits himself to some Privileged Access 
Thesis in the Meditations frequently cite passages in the second or third meditations. For 
example, some scholars think that the meditator implicitly draws on infallibility, 
omniscience, or both in the second meditation, in his reasoning surrounding the cogito,21 
for sum res cogitans,22 and even in his discussion of the wax.23 Other commentators think 
that the meditator relies on Privileged Access in the third meditation when claims to know 
                                                      
19 Sometimes the Omniscience Thesis is called the Self-Intimation or Self-Presentation 
Thesis. Ryle (140) Audi (91), Vinci (10), McRae (57), Kenny (70-72), and Williams (70) 
attribute the view to Descartes. Broughton (2008, 179) and Wilson (150-165) partly 
attribute the view. Curley (170-193), Newman (2), and Rozemond (57-66) do not. The 
Omniscience Thesis is limited to occurent states rather than latent or standing mental states. 
Descartes likely thought that there are latent mental states—in particular, innate ideas—that 
we are not always aware of, or at the least not clearly and distinctly aware of. See Nelson 
(163-178) for a discussion of innate ideas in Descartes’ philosophy. 
20 See my discussion of certainty in chapter two, page 68-70.  
21 Kenny (47-48), McRae (57), Williams (71), and Wilson (59-60). 
22 Kenny (70-72), McRae (57), Williams (71), and Wilson (150-165).  





that he has clear and distinct perceptions,24 or in his taxonomy of ideas and thoughts.25 In 
this chapter, I have argued that from the very beginning of the Meditations, the meditator 
relies on his privileged access to his own mind while he engages in the enterprise of 
doubting his beliefs. In the next chapter, I will consider how the meditator might defend the 
certainty present in his first meditation doubts.  
  
                                                      
24 Broughton (2008, 193). 









The purpose of the last chapter was to defend an interpretation of the Meditations according 
to which the meditator secures certainty of his existence by way of the naïve argument 
against an objection made by Harry Frankfurt. “If the peculiar value of deriving sum from 
cogito actually consisted in the certitude of cogito,” Frankfurt objects, “Descartes ought to 
establish or at least to claim that cogito is in fact a statement of which he is certain. He does 
not do so” (111).  
 In response, I argued that the meditator holds that the second-order judgments that 
occurred to him during his reaction to the skeptical arguments in the first meditation are 
certain. These second-order judgments are equivalent to asserting cogito. An example of 
one of these second-order judgments is: “I have no answer to these arguments”, which I 
rewrote as “I am convinced by these skeptical arguments.” We can see that the meditator 
regards this second-order judgment as certain for at least two reasons. First, he asserts it in 
the first meditation after saying that he should not assert anything which is not certain. 
Second, Descartes responds to Gassendi by saying that (perhaps all) his second-order 
judgments are certain.  
Moreover, the meditator doesn’t single out his belief that he convinced himself of 
something as the only second-order judgment from which it follows that he exists. He 
thinks many second-order judgments, perhaps any of his second-order judgments, will 
suffice. The French translation underscores this point. There, Descartes modifies the if-then 





all, then I certainly existed” (AT VII 25; CSMK 2:17. My italics).26 Thus, the meditator 
takes all his second-order judgments to be completely certain. This applies to second-order 
judgments with the most attenuated content (a generic “I think”) to those that provide rich 
reports of one’s own mental life (“I am convinced by the argument” and “My former 
opinions keep coming back.”).  
 It seems, then, that Descartes holds a strong thesis about the certainty we enjoy 
about own our minds. 
The Certainty of Mind: For all of S’s mental states (M’s), if S forms the second-order 
the judgment or belief that she is in M, then this second-order judgment/belief is 
certain.   
 
Thus, against Frankfurt’s objection, the meditator does regard cogito, which is a second-
order judgment, as certain. It’s in part due to the meditator’s adherence to this thesis that he 
can mount a cogent argument for his existence. 
 Still, I have not yet offered a full response to Frankfurt’s objection. Frankfurt 
objects that the naïve interpretation requires (1) that Descartes offers an account of why 
cogito is certain, or (2) that Descartes at the least claim cogito to be certain, and Descartes 
does neither. In the last chapter, I have shown that Frankfurt’s second demand is satisfied 
by examining the first meditation. Now, I will show that Frankfurt’s second demand can 
also be met.  
This chapter will proceed under the assumption, suggested by Frankfurt, that if the 
naïve interpretation is true, then Descartes should have some argument in support of the 
Certainty of Mind Thesis. I concede that Descartes doesn’t explicitly indicate why CM is 
                                                      
26 “On certes, j'étais sans doute, si je me suis persuadé, ou seulement si j'ai pensé quelque 





true in the Meditations. I will argue that, whether he knew it or not, in the first meditation 
Descartes makes available to the meditator a compelling argument for CM, or rather a 
slightly more restricted version the thesis. This argument begins with the assumption that 
the meditator can doubt his first-order beliefs. The argument then shows that the certainty 
of the meditator’s second-order judgments that are integral to his enterprise of doubt follow 
from the assumption that he can doubt his beliefs. Tyler Burge makes a similarly structured 
argument for a somewhat weaker privileged access thesis than CM. So, midway through 
this chapter we will consider Burge’s argument to assist us in our reconstruction of 
Descartes.   
 
I. Does Descartes Already Have an Argument for CM?  
 
Reconstructing an argument for CM would be ill-advised if Descartes makes a 
strong case for it elsewhere. Let us consider whether Descartes already has a satisfactory 
argument. To look for an argument, we might return to Descartes’ response to Gassendi’s 
objection, perhaps the most explicit endorsement of CM across Descartes’ works. 
Gassendi’s objection is that the cogito argument is too restrictive; he contends that the 
meditator could have inferred sum from a premise about any of his actions, such as “I 
walk” rather than only “I think.” Descartes responds by saying, “the inference is certain 
only if applied to this awareness [of walking], and not to the movement of the body which 
sometimes—in the case of dreams—is not occurring at all” (AT VII 352; CSMK 2:244).  
One might read a trace of an argument for CM in Descartes’ response: if one is 
aware of a mental state M, then one is certain that she is in M. However, I don’t think that 





certain. We can be certain that we are aware that our body is in some state, but we cannot 
be certain that our body is in some state. That is, Descartes is only specifying what we can 
be certain about. If this passage is to offer an argument for CM, Descartes must tell us why 
awareness or consciousness provides certainty. Here, he does not do this.27  
Some commentators have interpreted Descartes as defending CM and other theses 
concerning privileged access such as infallibility and omniscience by an appeal to his 
stipulated definitions of “thought” and “idea” from the Second Replies (AT VII 160-161; 
CSMK 2:113).28 I think this reading is undesirable. If Descartes did in fact rely purely on 
stipulated definitions in support of CM, a substantial thesis about privileged access, we 
should seek an alternative reconstruction if possible. Arguments that resort only to 
stipulated definitions are unsuccessful. Now, if Descartes didn’t rely purely on stipulated 
definitions to establish CM (in my view, McRae and Kenny don’t adduce forceful evidence 
that Descartes means for CM to follow from his definitions of “thought” and “idea”), then 
the defense-by-definition reading is plainly uncharitable. We ought to keep looking for an 
argument for CM.  
Another area to examine for a defense of CM may be Descartes’ doctrine of clear 
and distinct perception. At the beginning of the third meditation, the meditator seems to 
suggest that a perception being completely clear and distinct is a mark of what is known 
and certain (AT VII 34-35; CSMK 2:24-25). Perhaps Descartes thought that we can have 
clear and distinct perceptions of our current first-order mental states, and, in this way, be 
certain of cogito.  
                                                      
27 Broughton also makes this point (2008, 188-189). 





While it would take me too far afield to examine Descartes’ doctrine of clear and 
distinct perceptions, and whether Descartes might have relied on it in support of CM, I wish 
only to say that there are interpretations of the doctrine on which it doesn’t support CM. 
For example, Alan Nelson argues for an interpretation of the doctrine on which only innate 
ideas can be clearly and distinctly perceived (163-167). Further, on Nelson’s view, we only 
have innate ideas of God, ourselves, corporeal bodies, eternal truths, and possibly also 
pains and colors. I understand Nelson’s reading as implying that we cannot have clear and 
distinct perceptions of our current first-order mental states, such as my belief that there is a 
computer screen in front of me, because these mental states are not inborn in us and latent, 
as are innate ideas. Rather, my current first-order mental states come and go. CM, on the 
other hand, does assert the certainty of judgments about our current first-order mental 
states. So, if Nelson’s interpretation is correct, then the certainty of our judgments about 
our current first-order mental states must come from another source. And even if the 
doctrine of clear and distinct perception can successfully be extended to CM, I think it 
would be insightful to find that the Meditations contains an alternative argument for CM 
unsupported by the doctrine of clear and distinct perception. That is what I will turn to next. 
 
II. Clues for Reconstructing Descartes’ Argument for the Certainty of Mind 
Thesis 
Our attempt to locate Descartes’ own defense of the Certainty of Mind Thesis has proved 
unsuccessful. In the places in which Descartes appeals to CM in his response to Gassendi, 
he does so without an account of why, when we judge ourselves to be in a particular mental 





depend on Descartes’ definition of “thought” or his doctrine of clear and distinct perception 
look problematic. 
  These two points—that Descartes neither gave an outright account of why CM is 
true nor has an in-house epistemological doctrine that can be extended to second-order 
judgments—should motivate us to dig deeper for an argument somewhere in the 
Meditations for the thesis. If we wish to find Descartes’ account of the truth of CM, the best 
we might be able to do is to find several commitments the meditator makes on Descartes’ 
behalf that can be linked into a plausible argument for CM, even if we are unable to 
uncover evidence that Descartes himself intended to make such an argument.    
Where in the Meditations should we look for materials to reconstruct? One of the 
points I argued for in the first chapter was that the meditator relies on CM in the first 
meditation. After meditating on several skeptical arguments, he reflects on how his 
skeptical meditations have affected his belief system. He considers to what extent he has 
successfully doubted his former beliefs and whether more skeptical meditation is required 
to rid himself of beliefs that admit of the slightest doubt. It is in these reflective moments in 
which the meditator examines his current doxastic attitudes towards propositions he once 
firmly believed that he appeals implicitly to CM. And this appears to be the earliest point 
where the meditator relies on CM. The thesis becomes somewhat more explicit in the third 
paragraph of the second meditation, when, in the French translation, the meditator suggests 
that the certainty of the second-order judgments that occurred during his enterprise of doubt 
can be used to infer, and transfer certainty to, the fact that he exists.  
The first meditation then—specifically where meditator reflects on the effect of the 





an appropriate starting point for the reconstruction. Already, I think the seeds of an 
argument for CM having to do with the function of second-order judgments in undertaking 
rational and intellectual mental activities are evident from this passage.  
The argument in a compressed form might look like this. I can doubt my beliefs. I 
cannot doubt my beliefs unless I have second-order judgments that are certain about my 
belief system and how it’s responding to doubt. So, my second-order judgments, 
particularly those about my belief system and how it’s responding to doubt, are certain, at 
least while I’m actively doubting my beliefs. 
Descartes has available to him, given his commitments regarding the method of 
doubt, a detailed version of this argument. This argument trades on the idea that having 
certain second-order judgments is constitutive of the method of doubt. To consider how this 
argument might proceed, we should more closely investigate the meditator’s second-order 
judgments during the first meditation. Below I articulate four observations concerning the 
role of the meditator’s second-order judgments in his project of doubting his beliefs. 
First, the meditator’s second-order judgments are essential to the enterprise of 
doubt. Consider once more some of the meditator’s second-order judgments.  
• “I have no answer to these arguments” (AT VII 21; CSMK 2:14) 
• “[I] am compelled to admit there is not one of my former beliefs about which a 
doubt may not be properly raised” (AT VII 21; CSMK 2:14-15) 
• “I must make an effort to remember [not to assent to my former beliefs]” (AT VII 
22; CSMK 2:15) 
• “My habitual opinions keep coming back” (ibid) 
 
These thoughts are not randomly or contingently connected to the meditator’s first-order 
mental activities. For an example of a contingent connection, suppose my (first-order) 
belief that I get to see my dog today popped into my head. Furthermore, then I reflectively 





today. In that case, my second-order judgment is contingently connected to my current 
first-order belief. I could have thought “I get to see my dog today” without reflectively 
judging “I’m currently believing that I get to see my dog today.” 
Unlike the dog case, as the meditator engages in the method of doubt, the changes 
in his first-order beliefs require him to make second-order judgments about his first-order 
beliefs. It’s inconceivable that the meditator (or anyone else) could doubt all his first-order 
perceptual beliefs, and withhold belief from them, all without having any second-order 
judgments about how his outlook on the world has changed. Of course, we frequently cast 
doubt on our beliefs without having second-order judgments. For example, as I raise what 
looks like veggie pizza to my mouth, my friend Jim interposes: “I think that has some meat 
on it.” After that, I doubt that it’s veggie. Doubting it’s veggie pizza doesn’t require having 
second-order judgments. But some doubts do require having second-order judgments. The 
more pervasive one’s doubts, and the deeper the beliefs that are made suspect in the 
structure of one’s belief system, the more common it is to reflect on and review one’s 
doubts. Furthermore, the meditator’s doubts, which are extensive (the doubt strikes many 
beliefs in the system) and extreme (the doubt strikes beliefs that confer justification to 
many other beliefs) require second-order judgments. They are an essential part of 
meditator’s process of doubt.  
My second point is an extension of the point just made, that the meditator’s second-
order judgments are essential to doubting his first-order beliefs. For Descartes, to doubt a 
belief is to use one’s faculty of reason, among other things. Furthermore, to successfully 





second-order judgments, which we observed is essential to doubting an entire belief system, 
is also essential to using reason to its fullest.  
I will say a little more about how Descartes understands doubt to be an activity 
performed by reason. Descartes believes that as we grow up, by habit we come to rely 
mostly on our senses for knowledge. This reliance conceals us from the perfect knowledge 
(scientia) in metaphysics and the sciences, causing us to have many false beliefs in these 
areas. Massive doubt is a process in which reason frees itself from the senses, allowing 
reason to discover true and certain metaphysical and scientific conclusions. This view of 
doubt as a process whereby reason frees itself can be found in more than several places in 
Descartes’ corpus, but it’s presented quite clearly in the introductory materials to the 
Meditations. In the Synopsis to the Meditations, Descartes explains that the “usefulness of 
such extensive doubt” in the first meditation “lies in freeing us from all our preconceived 
opinions, and providing the easiest route by which the mind may be lead away from the 
senses” (AT VII 12; CSMK 2:9). In the Preface to the Reader, we are told that once the 
mind is freed (which is later identified with reason: “I am a mind, or intelligence, or 
intellect, or reason” (AT VII 27; CSMK 2:18)), it can “arrive at certain and evident 
knowledge of the truth.” (AT VII 10; CSMK 2:8).  
Previously we saw that the meditator’s second-order judgments are essential to his 
enterprise of doubt. Now, considering how Descartes holds the view that reason entails the 
power to doubt, it follows that having second-order judgments is essential to reason 
exercising its full authority. 
The final two points regard the way in which second-order judgments enter and 





The third point is that the meditator’s second-order judgments are about first-order 
mental states that are relevant to the process of extensive doubt. Of course, some of the 
meditator’s second-order judgments, like “My habitual opinions keep coming back”, are 
just about his first-order beliefs. These second-order states allow him to assess and monitor 
whether he still holds various beliefs after meditating on the skeptical arguments. Other 
second-order judgments concern the connection between his former beliefs and his reasons 
for holding them. For example, the meditator states how he is “compelled to admit” that all 
his former beliefs can be properly doubted “based on powerful and well-thought out 
reasons” (AT VII 21-22; CSMK 2:14-15). Here, the meditator is acknowledging that the 
skeptical arguments are reasons his former beliefs could be false. The meditator also has 
second-order judgments about attitudes other than beliefs, like his intention to follow 
through with the enterprise of doubt—“I shall stubbornly and firmly persist in this 
meditation…I shall…resolutely guard against assenting to any falsehoods” (ibid). So, the 
meditator has second-order judgments about his first-order beliefs, their reasons, and even 
non-belief states, such as his intentions to follow through with his enterprise of doubt. 
The fourth and final point I wish to make is that the meditator has another kind of 
second-order judgment about what he should believe. After the meditator thinks about how 
the skeptical arguments are reasons to think his former beliefs are false, he has the 
following thought: “I must withhold my assent from former beliefs just as carefully as I 
would from obvious falsehoods” (AT VII 21-22; CSMK 2:14-15, my emphasis).29 It’s 
appropriate to read “must” as expressing an intellectual standard that the meditator is 
                                                      
29 “ideoque etiam ab iisdem, non minùs quàm ab aperte falsis, accurate deinceps 





obligated to meet. The standard might be put as: no belief should be admitted into my belief 
system if it can be doubted at all. This reading, that the meditator is obligated to meet the 
standard, is underscored by the fact that the meditator makes a near-identical point in the 
second paragraph of the first meditation, where the meditator states that this is a standard 
that he should obey. “Reason now leads me to think that I should hold back my assent from 
opinions which are not completely certain and indubitable” (AT VII 18; CSMK 2:12).30 
Janet Broughton acknowledges that the meditator takes the standard to be something he 
should to satisfy when she calls the standard a “maxim of assent” (2003, 43-45).  
It’s apt to call this standard a maxim because thinking about the standard guides the 
meditator in restructuring his system of beliefs, just as a moral or practical maxim may 
guide an individual in determining how to conduct herself. Sometimes the maxim features 
in the meditator’s thoughts as a self-proclaimed intention or commitment to carry on with 
his quest for certainty. This is similar to how a runner, fatigued and far into her route, might 
say to herself: “I will run for another hour.”31 This formulation of the maxim of doubt as a 
self-proclaimed intention arises in the first paragraph of the second meditation, when the 
meditator states that he will continue to follow the maxim, his “path” to finding something 
that cannot be doubted.  
I will make an effort and once more attempt the same path which I started on 
yesterday. Anything which admits of the slightest doubt I will set aside just as if I had 
found it to be wholly false; and I will proceed in this way until I recognize something 
                                                      
30 “sed quia jam ratio persuadet, non minus accurate ab iis quae non plane certa sunt atque 
indubitata, quàm ab aperte falsis assensionem esse cohibendam” 
31 This is consistent with Broughton’s reading of the standard as a maxim since many 
maxims become intentions when we think and talk about them (“I will be a good neighbor 





certain, or, if nothing else, until I at least recognize for certain that there is no 
certainty. (AT VII 24; CSMK 2:16)32 
 
It’s also apt to call any judgment that the meditator has about the maxim a second-order 
judgment because, when one thinks about this maxim, one is thinking about one’s mind and 
what states it should have.  
 To recap, I have unearthed four claims about the meditator’s second-order 
judgments: 
1. They are essential to his enterprise of doubt. 
2. They are essential to using the full power of his reason to search for scientia. 
3. They concern his first-order beliefs and reasons. 
4. They concern the doubt-guiding maxim that he should not believe what can be 
doubted. 
 
These four points should be viewed as interpretive boundaries for any reconstruction of the 
Meditations. If an argument for CM can be reconstructed in the Meditations, and this 
argument incompatible with several of these points, then it probably would not attract 
Descartes.  
 
III. A Contemporary Rationalist Account of Self-knowledge 
Tyler Burge, in his article Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge, argues that our second-order 
judgments are rational—epistemically supported—because of our capacity to think through 
our reasons and beliefs as we actively try to figure out what to believe. In this section, I lay 
out Burge’s account of self-knowledge and his arguments for it. My purpose in exploring 
                                                      
32 Note that the meditator seems to understand the maxim of doubt as instructing him not 
only to stop assenting to uncertain beliefs, but, moreover, to consider them false. To 
consider a belief as false differs from merely suspending judgment or bracketing a belief 
off from one’s belief system. I bring this up only to note that there is subtlety in what 
exactly Descartes’ maxim of doubt directs an agent to do with his former beliefs. I will not 





Burge’s arguments is to return to the Meditations in the section to follow, where I will 
show how similar arguments to Burge’s can be reconstructed in support of the Certainty of 
Mind thesis. 
  According to Burge, we are rational beings. Rational beings are unique in that they 
have attitudes. Examples of attitudes include the belief that there will be a snowy 
Christmas, the desire to travel, or the intention to return a borrowed backpack. Now, 
rational beings do not just have attitudes on a whim. Their attitudes are based on reasons. I 
believe that there will be a snowy Christmas because the weatherman said so. I desire to 
travel because I value seeing new places. I intend to return a borrowed backpack because I 
agreed to return it.  
All these reasons can be said to support my attitudes. The reasons make my 
attitudes rational. But this is not always the case. Consider a little boy who believes there 
will be a snowy Christmas only because it snowed the Christmas before. He believes that it 
will snow this Christmas for a bad reason. The fact that it snowed last year on one 
particular day does not justify someone in thinking that it will snow again this year on the 
same date. 
 All rational beings are open to evaluation, unlike non-rational individuals such as 
rocks and thermometers. For example, the belief of the little boy who believes there will be 
a snowy Christmas this year is incorrect, even if there really will be a white Christmas. That 
is, even if his belief is true, he still does not believe as he should. The rock, or even the 
thermometer, which represents the weather, are closed to this type of evaluation since they 
do not have attitudes. Burge believes that mature humans, young children, and some non-





usually based on reasons and (3) their attitudes might be rational or irrational depending on 
their reasons for their attitudes. 
Burge does not think that just being rational—having attitudes that are based on 
reasons—entails having second-order judgments that are epistemically supported. For 
Burge, this requires a heightened rational capacity, which mature humans, but not children 
and animals, sometimes enjoy. Burge calls this “critical rationality.” His thesis is that “our 
epistemic warrant for our judgments about our thoughts…derives from the nature of the 
thinker as a critical reasoner” (91). 
 Before explaining Burge’s arguments for his thesis, it will be helpful to understand 
what Burge means by “critical rationality.” He defines the term of art as follows.    
As a critical reasoner, one not only reasons. One recognizes reasons as reasons. One 
evaluates, checks, weighs, criticizes, supplements one's reasons and reasoning. 
Clearly, this requires a second-order ability to think about thought contents or 
propositions, and rational relations among them. (98) 
 
While Burge thinks that only mature adults are capable of critical reasoning, and that they 
sometimes merely reason non-critically (that is, “blindly” without “appreciating reasons as 
reasons”) he thinks critical reasoning is common practice among adults (99). He does not 
strictly mark out where blind reasoning turns into critical reasoning. He does say that any 
individual who uses the term “therefore” is critically reasoning since such use requires 
“some conception of validity”, which in turn “requires an ability to think of the 
propositions in a proof as constituting reasons for what follows from them” (ibid).  
To illustrate the contrast, an example of blind reasoning might be when you get up 
from the couch after watching a weather report that calls for snow and begin to salt the 
driveway. Your behavior shows that you formed a belief that it will snow from watching 





weather report gives you good reason to believe it. But, in a way, you are blind to your 
reasoning. You do not, at the moment that you rise from the couch, appreciate that the 
testimony of the weather report serves as your reason for the snow belief. You are thinking 
about other things, perhaps about where the salt is in the garage and whether you need to 
put on an extra coat. So, you don’t appreciate the testimony as your reason; you do not 
appreciate your reason as a reason. 
Your blind reasoning might escalate into critical reasoning without you having an 
explicit second-order judgment like “the weather reports testimony gives me reason to think 
it will snow.” Suppose you have a toddler who is at the charming stage of development 
where she endlessly asks “why” questions. She waddles out to you as you salt the 
driveway. In responding to her questioning, you begin to critically reason. “Why are you 
salting?” she asks. “It’s going to snow tomorrow.” “Why?” “That’s what weather report 
said, so I think it will. They usually get it right.” When you respond to the second question, 
you are critically reasoning. You are thinking about—and evaluating—whether your snow 
belief is justified.  
Burge explains how critical reasoning need not always involve an explicit focus on 
attitudes: 
[Critical reasoning] also involves an ability to assess the truth and reasonability of 
reasoning-hence attitudes. This is not to say that critical reasoning must focus on 
attitudes, as opposed to their subject matter. Normally we reason not about ourselves 
but about the world or about practical goods. But to be fully a critical reasoner, one 
must be able to—and sometimes actually—identify, distinguish, evaluate 
propositions as asserted, denied, hypothesized or merely considered. (99-100) 
 
I read Burge as thinking that critical reasoning is incremental. Once a reasoner 
appreciates her reasons as reasons, she might appreciate her reasons as reasons in 





When a critical reasoner maximally appreciates her reasons as reasons, she explicitly 
identifies and distinguishes the attitude she takes towards the proposition that serves as 
her reason. 
 Neither does being a critical reasoner require that one’s first-order attitudes are true, 
let alone always rational. Someone’s attitudes may turn out to be considerably irrational. 
Their attitudes might be based on misleading evidence. Sometimes people engage in 
wishful thinking and their beliefs are motivated by non-evidential matters. Others are quite 
lazy and careless in forming their attitudes. This is all consistent with having the capacity to 
reason critically. Adults of varying degrees of intellectual ability are capable of critical 
reasoning and can conceive of themselves as having the capacity. Even Donald Trump: 
I call my own shots, largely based on an accumulation of data, and everyone knows 
it. Some FAKE NEWS media, in order to marginalize, lies!33 
 
 Central to critical reasoning is that “certain rational norms are necessarily associated 
with such reasoning” (98). It is essential that in recognizing reasons as reasons one also 
holds their reasons and attitudes to be subject to norms of reasoning. Burge does not 
identify specific norms. At one point, he says norms of reasoning exist that “are basic to all 
critical inquiry, including empirical, mathematical, philosophical, and practical inquiry” 
(108). He might well have in mind norms such as: 
• If you believe that p and you also believe that if p then q, you should believe that 
q. 
• Your beliefs should be based on good reasons. 
• Your beliefs should fit your evidence. 
 
                                                      








We rarely speak of these sorts of standards in everyday conversation, although they 
do come up periodically, especially when we argue with each other. Consider the protester 
who yells at a climate change denier, “you have no respect for scientific evidence!” It is 
plausible that one thing the protester means when she says this is: “You—climate denier—
should have beliefs that fit your evidence. You fail to satisfy this norm of reasoning.”  
Burge’s idea is that when we critically review our beliefs and reasons, we are 
subjecting our beliefs and reasons to these sorts of norms. Admittedly, as critical reasoners, 
we may rarely have an explicit representation of the relevant norm of reasoning while we 
review and evaluate our beliefs. But an agent who critically reasons does more than just 
satisfy a norm of reasoning. Back in the case of blind reasoning where you form the snow 
belief while watching the weather report, you successfully satisfy the rational standard that 
your beliefs should be based on good reasons. But when critically reasoning, the relation of 
the reasoner to the norms is more intimate. As Burge articulates the more intimate relation, 
“genuinely critically reasoning requires an application of rational standards to [one’s] 
commitments” (100). So, a critical reasoner must not only operate in ways where her 
beliefs and reasons satisfy the norms of rationality. She must review her beliefs and reasons 
via second-order thinking and make this review a critical review by applying norms of 
reasoning to her beliefs and reasons. Furthermore, the purpose of this application of norms 
of reasoning is to control one’s belief system. As Burge puts it, the point of the application 
is to “confirm and correct attitudes and reasons (not merely to assess logical and evidential 





For Burge, critical reasoners, who can control their attitudes by critically reviewing 
whether they meet certain rational standards, are epistemically responsible for their 
attitudes in a way that merely rational creatures are not.  
We are epistemically responsible only because we are capable of reviewing our 
reasons and reasoning. And we are paradigmatically responsible for our reasons when 
we check and review them in the course of critical reasoning. (111) 
 
We usually imply that various people are responsible for the rationality of their attitudes 
around the same time that someone refers in conversation to a standard of rationality. 
Recall the protester who yells at a climate change denier, “you have no respect for scientific 
evidence!” Besides evaluating the rationality of the climate denier’s attitudes, the protester 
is blaming the climate denier for not doing so herself. And it is not just moral blame. The 
denier is in part being blamed epistemically for failing to control and critically review her 
climate beliefs. On the other hand, merely rational individuals cannot be blamed for their 
attitudes. It would be a category error to fault the little boy for believing in a white 
Christmas because there was one last year. He is too young to appreciate his belief about 
Christmas last year as his reason. He is not psychologically developed enough to be able to 
critically review whether his reason is good evidence. 
             To take stock, we just seen what, on Burge’s view, critical reasoning is, which he 
thinks is a fairly common practice among adults. The meditator is a prime example of a 
critical reasoner. He reviews his beliefs and the reasons on which he holds them. He 
controls his beliefs through the application of the maxim of doubt, and this leads him to 
consider skeptical reasons for thinking his beliefs may be false. This procedure of doubt 
requires the meditator to make second-order judgments to survey his belief system and 





              There is more in Burge, however, that will be useful to us. The aim of this chapter 
is to reconstruct an argument in the Meditations for CM. In articulating the concept of 
critical reasoning, which requires second-order judgments, Burge has not yet provided any 
argument that the second-order judgments of critical reasoners are themselves rational or 
certain. I now turn to Burge’s arguments. In the next section, I will show how the meditator 
can be reconstructed as making similar arguments.  
 First, a word about the type of argument Burge employs. Although Burge does not 
characterize his arguments as transcendental arguments, several philosophers have 
interpreted them as such.34 They might be thought to be transcendental in the following 
sense. First, Burge makes the assumption that we are capable of critical reasoning, and no 
argument is given for this assumption: “All of us, even sceptics among us, recognize a 
practice of critical reasoning” (98). Then, without relying on the assumption that we are 
capable of critical reasoning, Burge reasons to the intermediate conclusion that a necessary 
condition for being a critical reasoner is that our second-order judgments are rational. 
Finally, with the transcendental assumption that we are capable of critical reasoning in 
place, he concludes that we do have rational second-order judgments. 
 Second, a word on the scope of Burge’s arguments. Burge limits the scope of his 
arguments only to establishing that we have epistemically supported second-order 
judgments about our propositional attitudes. He does not apply his transcendental 
arguments to our second-order judgments about mental states such as “imaging, 
remembering, or reasoning about sensed inner-goings on” (104, Burge’s emphasis). He 
thinks our second-order judgments about our daydreams, memory states, pain states, or 
                                                      





sensations such as the redness of my visual experience when I look at an apple, and the 
like, are rational. However, the reason for the epistemic support of these kinds of second-
order judgments is not our status as critical reasoners. Burge’s arguments apply to second-
order judgments about the mental states that we critically review while critical reasoning 
about what to believe or do. These are judgments about our attitudes—beliefs, desires, 
intentions, and whatever other stances we might take to propositions. Burge usually speaks 
of beliefs, and this attitude is most pertinent to my discussion of Descartes, so I will confine 
my discussion of Burge’s argument to second-order judgments about one’s beliefs.  
 The first thing Burge intends to show is that we are epistemically entitled to our 
second-order judgments. Burge contrasts epistemic entitlement, a term he introduces, with 
justification. For Burge, justification and entitlement are distinct species of “epistemic 
warrant” (the property of a true belief that makes it count as knowledge)—what I have been 
calling “rational” or “epistemically supported” (versus irrational/unsupported) belief.35 
When someone’s belief is justified, if pressed they are usually able to access and articulate 
the reason on which they hold their belief. On the other hand, the kinds of beliefs we are 
entitled to are those that we cannot access or articulate reasons for without “extreme 
philosophical difficulty” (93). Moreover, “this articulation need not be part of the repertoire 
of the individual that has the entitlement” (ibid). So, the contrast concerns whether a 
believer can access and articulate the reason she holds her belief.36  
                                                      
35 Justification and entitlement are also non-overlapping properties. None of the sorts of 
beliefs that are entitled (most second-order beliefs, e.g. “My reason is that I saw the 
weather report” and non-inferred perceptual beliefs, e.g. “I’m looking at the weather report 
on TV”) can be justified. And conversely, none of the sorts of beliefs that are justified (e.g. 
“It will snow tomorrow”) can be entitled.  
36 Assuming the believer can reason critically. Some individuals, like young children, will 





 While Burge uses “entitlement” in a rather technical fashion, he intends it to bear 
some connection to how rights are discussed in moral and political discourse. At times, he 
even shifts from speaking of epistemic entitlements to “epistemic rights.”37   
 Below is what I take to be the key passage where Burge argues that the capacity for 
critical reasoning implies entitlement to one’s second-order judgments. 
If one's judgments about one's attitudes or inferences were not reasonable—if one had 
no epistemic entitlement to them—one’s reflection on one's attitudes and their 
interrelations could add no rational element to the reasonability of the whole process. 
But reflection does add a rational element to the reasonability of reasoning. It gives 
one some rational control over one's reasoning. (101) 
 
Here, Burge is claiming that entitlement to one’s second-order judgments is a consequence 
of being a critical reasoner, someone epistemically responsible for controlling her attitudes 
through critical review. While Burge will introduce the idea that critical reasoners are 
epistemically responsible for their attitudes several pages later in his paper, it is this fact he 
is alluding to when he speaks of the “rational element” of the “whole process” of critical 
reasoning and the fact that critical reasoners have “rational control over [their reasoning].”  
What Burge is claiming is that since we are obliged and responsible for making our 
belief system meet rational standards, it follows that we also have an epistemic 
right/entitlement to make second-order judgments. If the second-order judgments I have in 
while I critically review my belief are not something I am entitled to, then I would not be 
responsible for making my beliefs accord with rational norms through critical reasoning. 
 As I read Burge, his argument relies on some principle linking responsibility and 
entitlement such as the following: 
Responsibility Implies Entitlement: If S has a responsibility (/obligation/ought) to X 
and S is required to Y to X, then S is entitled to (/has the right to/is permitted to) Y.  
                                                      






To illustrate the Responsibility Implies Entitlement Principle, consider growing up in a 
household where you are responsible for taking out the trash. Being responsible for 
taking out the trash entitles you to things. For example, it affords you the right to access 
the garage and to walk the garbage bin down the driveway on trash day since you must 
do those things to carry out your responsibility.  
 The same principle is at work in Burge’s argument. As critical reasoners, at 
times we are responsible for undertaking a critical review to make our attitudes accord 
with standards of reasoning. A critical review requires second-order thinking about 
one’s attitudes. Therefore, critical reasoners have the right to their second-order 
judgments while engaging in a critical review.  
 Burge’s argument can be represented as follows. 
(1) We are critical reasoners. (Assumption for Trans. Argument) 
(2) Thus, we are responsible for critically reviewing our attitudes. (1, by def.) 
(3) If we are responsible for critically reviewing our attitudes, we are required to 
form second-order judgments about our attitudes. (Premise) 
(4) If S has a responsibility to X and S is required to Y to X, then S is entitled to Y. 
(Res. Implies Entl. Principle) 
(5) Therefore, we are entitled to our second-order judgments. (2,3,4 by instantiation) 
 
So, Burge has purportedly shown that the second-order judgments that critically rational 
individuals have in a critical review are epistemically entitled—so, the second-order 
judgments are rational; epistemically supported. However, some rational beliefs and 
judgments can turn out false. It could be that your belief that it will snow tomorrow, 
while rational since the weatherman said so, is false. We will see that the meditator has a 
modified version of this transcendental argument for CM—his second-order judgments 





Burge also wishes to demonstrate that the rationality and truth of second-order 
judgments in a critical review are inseparable. To establish that these second-order 
judgments are always true—that is, they cannot be in error (false)—Burge uses a 
thought experiment to reduce to absurdity a contrary view that says a critically rational 
agent could during a critical review have a false second-order judgment about her first-
order beliefs. He asks us to consider what he calls a “simple observational view of self-
knowledge.”38 On this view, we know about our first-order mental states by way of a 
contingent causal mechanism, like a mental scanner. The scanner produces second-order 
judgments that give us access to our mental life. But, being a contingent process, 
malfunction is possible. And in the event that the scanner malfunctions, we would have 
false second-order judgments about our lower-level mental life. Burge says: 
Not all one's knowledge of one's propositional attitudes can fit the simple 
observational model. For general application of the model is incompatible with the 
function of knowledge of one's own attitudes in critical reasoning. The main idea is 
that such application would entail a dissociation between cognitive review and the 
thoughts reviewed that is incompatible with norms of epistemic reasonability that are 
basic to all critical inquiry, including empirical, mathematical, philosophical, and 
practical inquiry. (108) 
 
Burge says this incompatibility makes the simple observational model “nonsense” and 
concludes that the second-order judgments of a critically rational agent are always true. 
 Here is my best description of Burge’s thought experiment designed to bring out 
the absurdity of the simple observational model.39 The thought experiment will involve 
                                                      
38 By “simple observational view of self-knowledge”, Burge is referring to the inner sense 
theory of self-knowledge, according to which, we know our mind by way of a quasi-
perceptual mechanism, like a mental scanner, which is liable to malfunction. The inner 
sense theory/simple observational view was defended by David Armstrong (323-338) and 
William Lycan (ch 4). 





the case described on page 46, where you blindly reason to the snow belief and then are 
moved to critically reflect on the snow belief by the toddler. So, in the thought 
experiment it is assumed for sake of argument that you do have the first-order belief that 
it will snow tomorrow and you reason is that the weatherman said it would snow 
tomorrow. 
Suppose the simple observational model is true. Also suppose that you are a 
perfectly rational critical and blind reasoner.40  
Part 1. Consider when you reason blindly to the conclusion that it will snow 
tomorrow on the basis that the weather report said it would snow. Everyone should 
agree that you are justified in holding the snow belief, for it satisfies the relevant norm 
of rationality: one’s beliefs should fit one’s evidence. Thus, you should hold the snow 
belief (as you do in the case, by hypothesis).  
Part 2. Consider when the toddler moves you to critically reflect on your snow 
belief. However, in this case your mental scanner is broken. So, while you form the true 
second-order belief “I believe it will snow”, you also form the false second-order belief 
“My reason for my snow belief is that I wish it will snow.” Based strictly on the 
information you have in this critical review, everyone should agree that you are 
irrational in holding the snow belief. Thus, you have not satisfied the relevant norm of 
rationality—you should dump the snow belief from your belief system.41  
                                                      
40 I.e. in blind reasoning, you always satisfy the norms of reason. In critical reasoning, you 
always apply the norms of reason with perfect accuracy to what you (second-order) believe 
are your first-order attitudes. 
41 We are supposing that you have no other relevant evidence regarding tomorrow’s 





But it would be absurd to say that it is true of you both that you should and 
should not hold the snow belief. So, the simple observational model is false. Thus, the 
second-order judgments of a critically rational agent can never be in error.  
 So, Burge has given a transcendental argument that critically rational agents are 
epistemically entitled to the second-order judgments that function in a critical review of 
their beliefs and reasons. Burge has also purportedly shown through a thought 
experiment that a critically rational agent’s second-order judgments must be true. 
 
IV. The Meditator as a Critical Reasoner 
Having introduced Burge’s concept of critical rationality, we can view the meditator as a 
critically rational agent. His second-order judgments make up a critical review in which he 
articulates his beliefs and reasons as his beliefs and reasons. He evaluates them against a 
norm of reasoning: believe nothing that can be doubted. All this second-order mental 
activity is done with the aim of controlling and massively overhauling his belief system. In 
this section, I will show that we can reconstruct the meditator as making an argument for 
CM much like Burge’s transcendental argument for the claim that we are entitled to our 
second-order judgments. The argument can be gleaned primarily from the two opening 
paragraphs of the first meditation.  
 As a first step towards this reconstruction, the meditator assumes without argument 
that he is critically rational. Take the first two paragraphs of the Meditations. I quote the 
passage at length here because I refer to it at various points in this section. 
Some years ago I was struck by the large number of falsehoods that I had accepted as 
true in my childhood, and by the highly doubtful nature of the whole edifice that I 
had subsequently based on them. I realized that it was necessary, once in the course 





foundations if I wanted to establish anything at all in the sciences that was stable and 
likely to last. But the task looked an enormous one, and I began to wait until I should 
reach a mature enough age to ensure that no subsequent time of life would be more 
suitable for tackling such inquiries. This led me to put the project off for so long that 
I would now be to blame if by pondering over it any further I wasted the time still left 
for carrying it out. So today I have expressly rid my mind of all worries and arranged 
for myself a clear stretch of free time. I am here quite alone, and at last I will devote 
myself sincerely and without reservation to the general demolition of my opinions. 
 
But to accomplish this, it will not be necessary for me to show that all my opinions 
are false, which is something I could perhaps never manage. Reason now leads me to 
think that I should hold back my assent from opinions which are not completely 
certain and indubitable just as carefully as I do from those which are patently false. 
So, for the purpose of rejecting all my opinions, it will be enough if I find in each of 
them at least some reason for doubt. And to do this I will not need to run through 
them all individually, which would be an endless task. Once the foundations of a 
building are undermined, anything built on them collapses of its own accord; so I will 
go straight for the basic principles on which all my former beliefs rested. (AT VII 17-
18; CSMK 2:12) 
 
From the very first line, the meditator is writing from more than his own first-person 
perspective. He is writing from the perspective of a critical reasoner. The first meditation 
reads as an opening diary entry of someone embarking on a week or month long retreat to 
reflect on and evaluate her beliefs.  
I would like to press that we should read the meditator’s critically rational 
perspective as a substantive philosophical assumption rather than a choice of style on 
Descartes’ part. The meditator seems to suppose that regardless of whether he can find 
beliefs that are certain, he at least has the capacity to check his beliefs and consider whether 
they are certain or dubitable. In the first meditation, he never openly doubts whether he can 
know what his beliefs and reasons are, or whether he can accurately apprehend the norms 
of reason. Moreover, at the opening of the second meditation, the meditator holds that even 
if he finds no certain beliefs, he can be certain that he has found no certain beliefs: 
Nevertheless I will make an effort and once more attempt the same path which I 





as if I had found it to be wholly false; and I will proceed in this way until I recognize 
something certain, or, if nothing else, until I at least recognize for certain that there is 
no certainty. (AT VII 24; CSMK 2:16) 
 
As I read this, the meditator claims that even if his scheme to find certain first-order beliefs 
turns out fruitless, he can still be certain that he has found no certain first-order beliefs. This 
claim seems to rely on the meditator’s certainty that he can undertake and complete a 
critical review of his first-order beliefs.  
If we look across Descartes’ philosophical writings, it turns out that many of his 
works assume that humans are capable of critically reasoning about their attitudes and 
subjecting them to rational standards. Often the assumption is made in the opening lines, or 
even the title of each work. Take the full title of one of Descartes’ earliest works: Rules for 
the Direction of the Mind. There, Descartes sets down a series of rules that will help us 
become better thinkers in general and find truth across many academic disciplines.  
Descartes plainly assumes that we are critical reasoners in the Principles and the 
Discourse. Consider the beginning of the Discourse: 
Good sense is the best distributed thing in the world: for everyone thinks himself so 
well endowed with it that even those who are the hardest to please in everything else 
do not usually desire more of it than they possess. In this it is unlikely that everyone 
is mistaken. It indicates rather that the power of judging well and of distinguishing 
the true from the false—which is what we properly call 'good sense' or 'reason'—is 
naturally equal in all men, and consequently that the diversity of our opinions does 
not arise because some of us are more reasonable than others but solely because we 
direct our thoughts along different paths and do not attend to the same things. For it is 
not enough to have a good mind; the main thing is to apply it well. The greatest souls 
are capable of the greatest vices as well as the greatest virtues; and those who proceed 
but very slowly can make much greater progress, if they always follow the right path, 
than those who hurry and stray from it. (AT VI 1-2; CSMK 1:111) 
 
As this passage reads, Descartes might only be making the more modest assumption that 





endowed with reason comes with a capacity to reflectively criticize one’s opinions. After 
Descartes discusses the opinions he acquired in early life, he writes: 
But after I had spent some years pursuing these studies in the book of the world and 
trying to gain some experience, I resolved one day to undertake studies within myself 
too and to use all the powers of my mind in choosing the paths I should follow. (AT 
VI 10; CSMK 1:116) 
 
On the next page, Descartes illustrates what it means to “use all the powers of my mind 
in choosing the paths I should follow”: 
regarding the opinions to which I had hitherto given credence, I thought that I could 
not do better than undertake to get rid of them, all at one go, in order to replace them 
afterwards with better ones, or with the same ones once I had squared them with the 
standards of reason. (AT VI 13-14; CSMK 1:117) 
 
Descartes seems to think that possessing “reason” comes with the capacity to critically 
reason. As I read him, Descartes equates the “right path” a mind can take with a norm of 
reasoning. In the last quoted passage, he suggests that someone with reason can apprehend 
the norms of reason and apply them to their opinions during a critical review. In this way, 
the paths offer the critical reviewer guidance about what to think. As is clear in the first 
Discourse passage, Descartes also thinks that these paths or norms determine whether an 
opinion is reasonable or not.   
 The assumption also comes through in the Principles. There, Descartes says the first 
principle of human knowledge is that “the seeker after truth must, once in the course of his 
life, doubt everything, as far as is possible”: 
Since we began life as infants, and made various judgements concerning the things 
that can be perceived by the senses before we had the full use of our reason, there are 
many preconceived opinions that keep us from knowledge of the truth. It seems that 
the only way of freeing ourselves from these opinions is to make the effort, once in 
the course of our life, to doubt everything which we find to contain even the smallest 






Here, Descartes once again is in agreement with Burge that adults are capable of critically 
reasoning. Adults can recognize their beliefs as their own and judge their epistemic 
credentials. These skills are used to their full extent during the enterprise of doubt.   
 Further evidence that Descartes shares Burge’s assumption that adults are critical 
reasoners is revealed by similarities in their views about the reasoning capacities of 
children. For, Descartes states that babies make judgments and thus come to have 
“preconceived opinions.” He also thinks that infants have reasons for their beliefs, though 
very dubitable ones that they cannot reflect on. At the end of book one of the Principles, 
Descartes provides an elaborate theory of the developmental changes in the mind-body 
interactions of very young children and infants. Descartes hypothesizes that since the minds 
of very young children are “so closely tied to the body”, they are disposed to falsely judge 
that sensations are properties of external world objects on the basis of dubious metaphysical 
reasons (AT VIII 35-36; CSMK 1:218-219).42 Like Burge, Descartes holds that children are 
rational—but not critically rational—agents since they hold beliefs for reasons but cannot 
critically reflect on those reasons.  
We have seen that that the meditator assumes that he is critically rational. This is the 
first premise in Burge’s transcendental argument for the claim that the second-order 
                                                      
42 Descartes provides an earlier version of this view that infancy is the origin of false beliefs 
in a letter responding to an interlocutor under the alias “Hyperaspistes” (see Letter to 
Hyperaspistes, August 1641. AT III 3:424). Descartes says that “the human soul, wherever 
it be, even in the mother’s womb is always thinking.” He goes on to say that every baby has 
the innate ideas of God, himself, and self-evident truths in his mind although a baby either 
perceives them in a “confused” way or attends primarily to things “presented by the senses” 
rather than the innate ideas. Yet, if a baby were “released from the prison of the body, it 





judgments that feature in critical reasoning are epistemically supported and entitled. Recall 
Burge’s argument: 
(1) We are critical reasoners. (Assumption for Trans. Argument) 
(2) Thus, we are responsible for critically reviewing our attitudes. (1, by def.) 
(3) If someone is responsible for critically reviewing their attitudes, they are 
required to form second-order judgments about their attitudes. (Premise) 
(4) If S has a responsibility to X and S is required to Y to X, then S is entitled to Y. 
(Res. Implies Entl. Principle) 
(5) Therefore, we are entitled to our second-order judgments. (2,3,4) 
 
Having presented evidence that the meditator accepts premise (1), I wish to examine more 
closely the opening paragraphs of the first meditation, which are quoted on pages 57-58. I 
think a close reading of the second paragraph of the first meditation shows that meditator 
accepts the second and third premises of Burge’s argument.  
Earlier, we saw that Burge understands critical reasoners not only to have the real 
psychological capacity to critically review their beliefs against norms of reason but also to 
be epistemically responsible for their beliefs. In other words, critical reasoners are worthy 
of praise or blame depending on how they use their critical reasoning abilities to control 
their belief system. Burge builds this responsibility into the definition of a critical reasoner. 
Now, one possible position is to acknowledge that we are critical reasoners, those capable 
of subjecting our beliefs to critical review, but to reject that we are responsible for our 
beliefs in the way that Burge suggests.  
Like Burge, the meditator—and Descartes—works epistemic responsibility into the 
definition of a critical reasoner. However, the meditator goes further, holding that we have 
an epistemic responsibility and obligation to apply the stringent norm of doubt to our belief 





his belief system and that he “would now be to blame if by pondering over it any further I 
wasted the time still left for carrying it out” (AT VII 17; CSMK 2:12. My emphasis)  
One might object that there are other plausible readings of these lines. When the 
meditator says that it’s necessary for him to doubt his beliefs and he would be to blame if 
he procrastinated further, he is not really saying that he has a rational obligation or 
epistemic responsibility to doubt his beliefs. Maybe the meditator, who thinks he has a 
talent for finding certainty, feels compelled to realize his talent by extensively doubting his 
beliefs in the way that an artist might feel like she has to paint in her studio on Sunday 
mornings. Or perhaps Descartes, speaking through the meditator, is voicing the pull of his 
professional duty as a philosopher to make philosophical progress, and he views doubting 
his beliefs as the first step.  
There is considerable evidence that Descartes really does think that we are 
responsible, as critically rational agents, to doubt our entire belief system. He thinks this 
mandate stems from our situation as reason-endowed beings. The responsibility doesn’t 
come from considerations that vary from person to person, such as ambitions, desires, or 
careers.  
A quick detour to the fourth meditation shows that Descartes thinks that all humans, 
because we are minded beings, are epistemically responsible for doubting our belief 
system. In the fourth meditation, the meditator, who has purportedly proven the existence 
of God in the third meditation, attempts to dispel the suspicion that a deceptive God is the 
best explanation of the source of human cognitive error (making false judgments). Once the 





that God is entirely praiseworthy and wouldn’t allow us to form false judgments from clear 
and distinct perceptions. We have only ourselves to blame for errors in our belief system.   
  The meditator argues that we are only to blame by presenting a subtle 
psychological account of how we make judgments: 
I perceive that the power of willing which I received from God is not, when 
considered in itself, the cause of my mistakes; for it is both extremely ample and also 
perfect of its kind. Nor is my power of understanding to blame; for since my 
understanding comes from God, everything that I understand I undoubtedly 
understand correctly, and any error here is impossible. So what then is the source of 
my mistakes? It must be simply this: the scope of the will is wider than that of the 
intellect; but instead of restricting it within the same limits, I extend its use to matters 
which I do not understand. Since the will is indifferent in such cases, it easily turns 
aside from what is true and good, and this is the source of my error and sin. (AT VII 
58; CSMK 2:40-41) 
 
On Descartes’ view, God has outfitted us with two perfect faculties, the understanding and 
the will, that work together to produce judgments. When we make false judgments, the 
source of error is in our own operation of these perfect faculties, not the God-given 
faculties themselves. The reason Descartes goes into all this is to shift responsibility for 
human error from God to humanity.  
The overall strategy of argument in the fourth meditation—demonstrating that 
humans are responsible for the truth and falsity of their judgments—confirms Descartes’ 
commitment to the view that humans are epistemically responsible for doubting their 
beliefs. Indeed, in the fourth meditation, Descartes doesn’t frame this as a responsibility to 
doubt one’s beliefs, but merely to make true judgments rather than false ones. However, as 
we have previously seen, on Descartes’ view it as an unfortunate reality of early childhood 
development that we come to have false beliefs. For Descartes, doubting one’s beliefs is a 
necessary first step to eliminating all false beliefs and beginning to form new true beliefs. 





his claim that we are responsible for avoiding error implies a responsibility to doubt our 
beliefs given his view that doubt rids ourselves from holding erroneously formed beliefs. 
Outside of the Meditations, Descartes repeatedly suggests that we have an 
obligation to seek the truth and that this is accomplished through extensive critical doubt. 
To Gassendi, who in the Fifth Set of Objections says he approves of Descartes’ project of 
freeing the mind from all preconceived opinions, Descartes responds: “Indeed, no one can 
pretend that such a project should not be approved of” (AT VII 348; CSMK 2:241-242). A 
few lines later, Descartes writes that the enterprise of doubt is a project that “everyone 
agrees should be performed.”  
Later, in the preface to the French edition of the Principles, Descartes bids 
newcomers to philosophy, which in his view starts with doubt, a necessary first step in 
seeking wisdom. He motivates critical reason-based philosophy by arguing that our status 
as minded beings carries an obligation to philosophize: 
The brute beasts, who have only their bodies to preserve, are continually occupied in 
looking for food to nourish them; but human beings, whose most important part is the 
mind, should devote their main efforts to the search for wisdom, which is the true 
food of the mind. (AT IX 4; CSMK 1:180) 
 
And a few lines later: 
Now this supreme good, considered by natural reason without the light of faith, is 
nothing other than the knowledge of the truth through its first causes, that is to say 
wisdom, of which philosophy is the study. (AT IX 4; CSMK 1:180-181) 
 
For Descartes, the best thing that we can do is discover philosophical knowledge, scientia, 
the true principles that serve as the structure of other non-basic knowledge. Since this 
wisdom is the supreme good, we have an obligation and responsibility to search for it. It’s 





derived from our responsibility to search for wisdom, our ultimate responsibility. Perhaps, 
Descartes might argue for our responsibility to critically review our attitudes as follows:43 
(1) It is our responsibility to search for wisdom. (AT IX 4; CSMK 1:180-181) 
(2) Thus, it is our responsibility to avoid all error and seek the truth. (from 1; AT VII 
58; CSMK 2:40-41) 
(3) Our belief system is founded on false beliefs from childhood. (AT VIII 35-36; 
CSMK 1:218-219) 
(4) Thus, it is our responsibility to critically doubt our beliefs (from 2,3; AT VII 17-18; 
CSMK 2:12) 
 
Having seen that Descartes thinks that we are responsible for critically reviewing 
our belief system, let us consider whether he accepts the third premise in Burge’s argument, 
that forming second-order judgments about one’s belief system is required to carry out 
one’s obligation to critically doubt one’s belief system.  
In the second paragraph of the first meditation, the meditator suggests that doubt 
requires inspection of on one’s opinions.  
For the purpose of rejecting all my opinions, it will be enough if I find in each of 
them at least some reason for doubt. And to do this I will not need to run through 
them all individually, which would be an endless task. Once the foundations of a 
building are undermined, anything built on them collapses of its own accord (AT VII 
18; CSMK 2:12. My italics) 
 
While the explicit mention of second-order thinking is absent here, the meditator regards 
reflecting on his beliefs—his basic, foundational beliefs—as a key part of tracking down 
the beliefs that are to be subjected to doubt. 
 In the Seventh Objections and Replies, Descartes again appears to acknowledge the 
role of second-order judgments in the method of doubt. To elucidate the position of the 
                                                      
43 I cite the passages to show where Descartes makes each responsibility claim. Of course, 
the citations in conclusions (2) and (4) are in no way meant to show that Descartes intended 
the reader to see that a responsibility claim he made in one work followed from a 





meditator at the opening of the Meditations, Descartes draws an analogy to a person who 
has a basket of apples and, having learned that some of his apples are rotten, is afraid that 
the rot may spread to the remaining good juicy apples. Descartes says that it would be 
prudent for him to tip over the basket, and then “cast his eye over each apple in turn, and 
pick up and put back in the basket only those he saw to be sound, leaving the others” (AT 
VII 481; CSMK 2:324. My emphasis). Of course, Descartes means for the apples to 
represent the meditator’s beliefs.44 Crucially, the language Descartes uses to convey how 
the man must sort out the apples—by “casting his eye over them” and putting back only 
“those he saw to be sound” suggests that the method of doubt requires second-order 
judgments at various stages in the process. Second-order judgments are necessary to first 
identify one’s foundational beliefs and then make determinations about their epistemic 
credentials. 
 Thus, from the very beginning of the Meditations, the meditator accepts the 
premises of an argument that establishes that he is epistemically entitled to second-order 
judgments. While he neither explicitly links these premises into an argument for that 
conclusion or comments on the Responsibility-Implies-Rights Principle, we should 
reconstruct the meditator as making such an argument to defend the reasonableness of his 
reflective judgments that are part of his process of doubt.  
Now, it would be highly anachronistic to reconstruct the meditator as concluding, 
on the basis of this argument, that his second-order judgments are epistemically entitled, 
                                                      
44 One relevant difference between Descartes’ apple sorting example and the process of 
doubt is that, with the apples, all the apples are inspected. By contrast, in the process of 
doubt, only basic beliefs, the ones on which the rest of one’s belief system is derived, are 





since epistemic entitlement is a term of art from a contemporary philosophy. However, 
Burge is happy to state his conclusion in terms of reasonable belief, or “epistemic warrant” 
as he calls it—he says that our second-order judgments are reasonable to believe (99). 
While the meditator uses many different epistemic concepts throughout the Meditations—
certainty, knowledge, the firmness and shakeability of belief, indubitability, scientia, and 
understanding—the meditator also has a notion of reasonable belief. This comes up at the 
end of the first meditation, where the meditator says that his former opinions, although 
doubtful, are still “highly probable” (valde probabiles) and “are much more reasonable to 
believe than to deny” (quas multo magis rationi confentaneum fit credere quà m negare) 
(AT VII 22; CSMK 2:15). So, it’s preferable to reconstruct the meditator as arguing for the 
reasonableness of his second-order judgments.45  
Of course, this reconstruction is not enough for the meditator. The meditator is 
committed to CM, the view that his second-order judgments are certain, which is a stronger 
claim than if one were to claim that they are reasonable. In the remainder of this section, I 
will consider how the special rigor of the meditator’s critical reasoning makes available a 
stronger version of the transcendental argument with a conclusion stated in terms of 
certainty rather than reasonable belief.  
What does certainty require, for Descartes? It’s beyond the scope of this thesis to 
delve fully into Descartes’ account of certainty, but the question deserves at least a 
                                                      
45 It should be said that the meditator doesn’t say here that his second-order judgments are 
reasonable—he doesn’t directly comment on the epistemic status of his second-order 
judgments in the quoted passage. I’m making the point that the meditator employs the 
concept of reasonable judgments/beliefs, and, so, if we are to reconstruct an argument on 
his behalf for why his second-order judgments carry positive epistemic status, he would 





provisional answer so that we may consider how the transcendental argument might show 
the certainty of the meditator’s second-order judgments. Sometimes “certain” is used to 
describe the state of an individual who believes to the fullest—is maximally persuaded, 
convinced, or confident about some issue. We might call this “psychological certainty.” 
Psychological certainty is only a matter of believing something as much as possible, given 
the limits of our psychology. In the following passage, commentator Peter Markie (55) 
reads Descartes as speaking of psychological certainty: 
And even if I had not demonstrated this [a mathematical truth like “The angles of a 
triangle equal two right angles”], the nature of my mind is such that I cannot but 
assent to these things, at least so long as I clearly perceive them. I also remember that 
even before, when I was completely preoccupied with the objects of the senses, I 
always held that the most certain truths of all were the kind which I recognized 
clearly in connection with shapes, or numbers or other items relating to arithmetic or 
geometry, or in general to pure and abstract mathematics. (AT VII 65; CSMK 2:45. 
My emphasis.) 
 
Yet, Descartes sometimes appears to use “certainty” to denote maximally 
reasonable belief. We have already seen this kind of certainty in the first meditation. It 
comes up when Descartes contrasts his old opinions, which are “much more reasonable to 
believe than to deny” to beliefs that are certain (AT VII 22; CSMK 2:15). This notion of 
certainty sometimes is called “epistemic certainty” since a belief being reasonable is 
understood to be closely related to a belief being justified, based on evidence, or based on a 
good reason. When someone’s belief is epistemically certain, her belief is as reasonable as 
a belief can possibly be, and, by definition, its maximal reasonability entails that the belief 
is true.46 It’s controversial whether Descartes really separates epistemic certainty from 
                                                      
46 Similar distinctions between psychological certainty and epistemic certainty are accepted 
by Markie (33-72), Frankfurt (102-105), and Vinci (12-13). Frankfurt articulates the 
distinction between psychological and epistemic certainty in terms of “descriptive” and 





psychological certainty. Perhaps one passage in which Descartes speaks more univocally in 
terms of epistemic certainty arises in the Second Set of Replies: 
if this conviction is so firm that it is impossible for us ever to have any reason for 
doubting what we are convinced of, then there are no further questions for us to ask: 
we have everything that we could reasonably want… such a conviction is clearly the 
same as the most perfect certainty. (AT VII 144-145; CSMK 2:103. My emphasis.) 
 
It what follows, epistemic certainty will be our focus. I will make the case that the 
meditator has available to him a modified version of Burge’s transcendental argument with 
conclusion that his second-order judgments are as reasonable as any belief or judgment can 
be. They are so reasonable that they are true. This modified argument trades on the unusual 
rigor of the meditator’s critical reasoning required for the method of doubt compared to 
that discussed by Burge. I will now explain how the meditator’s critical reasoning is 
especially rigorous. 
Compare the responsibilities of a mature adult to those of the meditator. Burge tells 
us that the mature adult, as someone capable of critically reasoning, is epistemically 
responsible for making his first-order beliefs respect “norms of epistemic reasonability 
basic to all critical inquiry, including empirical, mathematical, philosophical, and practical 
inquiry” (108). These norms of reasonability are norms such as “your beliefs should fit 
your evidence.” That is, on Burge’s view, we are responsible for making our attitudes only 
reasonable. To fulfill our epistemic responsibility, we must critically review and control 
our first-order attitudes by inspecting the reasons they are based on.  
By contrast, the meditator is called on to do so much more. On Descartes’ view, he 
is responsible for making his first-order beliefs respect the norm of doubt—“believe only 
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what is epistemically certain.” In other words, the meditator must make his first-order 
beliefs maximally reasonable. This requires using the robust norm of doubt rather than a 
norm such as evidential fit. We can see that the evidential fit norm is too weak for the 
meditator’s purposes since many of his former opinions—for example, believing that there 
is a fire before him and believing that the fire is warm—satisfy the norm of evidential fit, 
but, as the skeptical arguments purportedly show, are still uncertain.  
Descartes seems to register the stringency of the meditator’s epistemic obligation at 
least twice in the Meditations. First, in the preface to the Meditations he says that “the route 
which I follow” in acquiring certainty “is so untrodden and so remote from the normal 
way” (AT VII 7; CSMK 2:6). The stringency is again acknowledged at AT VII 22; CSMK 
2:15, a passage that has come up twice already, where the meditator says that his former, 
doubtable beliefs are still reasonable. So, the meditator concedes that his former first-order 
beliefs are epistemically supported since they stand up to the norms of reason used in 
ordinary critical review. The meditator, however, has ratcheted up the bar of acceptability.  
We saw earlier that the transcendental argument hinges on a link between one’s 
responsibility to critically reason and the reasonability of the second-order beliefs that are 
essential to the review. The idea was that someone couldn’t be responsible for making their 
first-order beliefs reasonable unless their second-order beliefs about the reasonableness of 
their first-order beliefs are also reasonable. This inference relies on a principle, the 
Responsibility Implies Entitlement Principle as I have called it, that links responsibility to 
reasonability (or entitlement, on Burge’s view). The principle (as applied to specifically to 
epistemic responsibility rather than moral or political responsibility, and also framed in 





epistemically responsible for having one’s belief system satisfy some norm X and 
satisfying X requires believing Y, then believing Y is reasonable.  
The same train of thought can be used to argue for the certainty of the meditator’s 
second-order judgments, given the rigor of his epistemic responsibility. In a compressed 
form, the idea is that the meditator cannot be epistemically responsible for ensuring that his 
belief system has only certain first-order beliefs unless his second-order judgments about 
the lower beliefs are certain. Here is the same point drawn out slightly more. The meditator 
is responsible for making his belief system adhere to the norm of doubt, the norm that one 
should believe only what is maximally reasonable. Now, for the meditator to satisfy the 
norm of doubt, he must have certain second-order judgments as part of a critical review of 
the epistemic credentials of his first-order beliefs, particularly whether those first-order 
beliefs are maximally reasonable. So, the meditator’s second-order beliefs that are part of 
the critical review are also maximally reasonable—certain. 
So, assuming that the meditator would accept some principle linking epistemic 
responsibility with reasonability, the meditator has available to him the following 
transcendental argument in defense of the Certainty of Mind Thesis. 
(1) We are critical reasoners. (Assumption for Transcendental Argument) 
(2) Thus, we are responsible for critically reviewing our belief system so that it 
satisfies the norm of doubt. (From 1, by def.) 
(3) If someone is responsible for critically reviewing their belief system so that it 
satisfies the norm of doubt, then they are required to form certain second-order 
judgments about their attitudes. (Premise) 
(4) If S has a responsibility to X and fulfilling X requires S to have a certain belief 
that Y, then S’s belief in Y is certain.47 (Particular version of Res. Implies Ent. 
                                                      
47 This is a specific version of the Responsibility Implies Entitlement Principle formulated 
in terms of maximal reasonable belief instead of entitlement. On pages 53-54 I discussed 
the principle and on pages 67-70 I explained how Descartes makes use of the epistemic 





Principle framed in terms of epistemic responsibility and maximally 
reasonable/certain belief) 
(5) Therefore, our second-order judgments are certain. (2,3,4) 
 
Having reconstructed the meditator as making the above argument, I wish to close 
by examining two objections.  
First, someone might question the inference to (5). The objection concedes that (2), 
(3), and (4) entail that the meditator’s second-order beliefs are reasonable, even almost 
maximally reasonable. However, the objection maintains that the meditator would be able 
to complete the method of doubt with second-order judgments that are merely highly 
reasonable, but still uncertain, second-order judgments.   
One response to this objection is that the epistemic reasonability of the meditator’s 
second-order beliefs must be at least as reasonable as the level of reasonability that he is 
responsible for ensuring at the first-order level. Since the meditator is required to make his 
first-order beliefs satisfy the norm of doubt, when he makes second-order judgments about 
whether his first-order beliefs satisfy the norm of doubt, those second-order judgments 
must themselves satisfy the norm of doubt, that is, be epistemically certain.  
A second response is that the meditator’s second-order judgments being only almost 
maximally reasonable is incompatible with the meditator’s claim that he can be certain that 
he has completed the method of doubt. Recall that in the second meditation, the meditator 
assumes that he can be certain that he can complete the method of doubt. For, he says that 
even if his inquiry turns up no certain beliefs, he can “at least recognize for certain that 
there is no certainty” (AT VII 24; CSMK 2:16). Now, if the meditator’s second-order 
judgments are anything less than certain, there would be some reason, however small, for 





enterprise of doubt. So, the possibility that the meditator’s second-order judgments are less 
than maximally rational is incompatible with his claim that he can recognize with certainty 
that his enterprise of doubt has come to an end, regardless of whether it turns up certain 
first-order beliefs or not.  
The other objection I will consider is that the transcendental argument that I claim is 
available to the meditator makes it too easy to have epistemically certain second-order 
judgments about one’s belief system. This objection points out that Descartes wrote the 
Meditations for the readers to follow and imitate the meditator’s thought process in order to 
discover metaphysical truth and eventually something firm and lasting in the sciences. 
However, the readers of the Meditations, though they are critical reasoners, aren’t perfect 
critical reasoners. It’s conceivable that while they are critically doubting their first-order 
beliefs, they might become mentally fatigued from the rigor of the inquiry, distracted, or 
thoroughly confused. If this were to happen, they could end up making a false second-order 
judgment about their belief system. They might mistake a first-order belief in a conditional 
claim for a belief in a categorical claim. Or perhaps while thinking about an argument 
during their critical review, they could mistake an assumption they grant for sake of 
argument as a premise that they believe. These second-order errors seem possible. But the 
transcendental argument has it that those who take up the critical enterprise of doubt don’t 
err at the second-order level. Their second-order judgments are so reasonable that they 
always accurately report on their first-order mental life. Thus, the transcendental argument 






In response to this objection, we will see that Descartes understands the meditator as 
someone who is more proficient at critical reasoning than most mature adults. In fact, the 
meditator is so proficient at critical reasoning that he cannot become distracted or mentally 
fatigued; he lacks the cognitive weaknesses that open him up to second-order error. Now, 
the transcendental argument only attributes second-order certainty to those who have 
reached the meditator’s ability to hyper-critically reason. So, the objection is misguided 
when it claims that the transcendental argument attributes second-order certainty to any 
critical reasoner who attempts to doubt their beliefs.  
Let us see where Descartes describes the meditator as an elite critical reasoner. One 
begins to see Descartes making this point in the Preface to the French Edition. There, 
Descartes is very clear that the Meditations is for a highly select audience: 
I am also going to deal with the foundations of First Philosophy in its entirety. But I 
do not expect any popular approval, or indeed any wide audience. On the contrary I 
would not urge anyone to read this book except those who are able and willing to 
meditate seriously with me, and to withdraw their minds from the senses and from all 
preconceived opinions. Such readers, as I well know, are few and far between. (AT 
VII 9; CSMK 2:8) 
Descartes even begins the Preface by telling the reader of the Meditations that he chose not 
to publish the first edition in French because he didn’t want masses of weak minded people 
to get ahold of it, only hardened academics conversant in Latin.  
The issues seemed to me of such great importance that I considered they ought to be 
dealt with more than once; and the route which I follow in explaining them is so 
untrodden and so remote from the normal way, that I thought it would not be helpful 
to give a full account of it in a book written in French and designed to be read by all 
and sundry, in case weaker intellects might believe that they ought to set out on the 
same path. (AT VII 7; CSMK 2:6-7) 
 
Previously I argued that Descartes thinks that the masses are in fact critical reasoners, but 
who usually apply (merely) norms of reasonable belief such as the norm of evidential fit, 





here saying that many humans are incapable of critically reflecting on their first-order 
beliefs. So, Descartes means something else when he calls many intellects “weak.”  
 For Descartes, the mind can gain certain knowledge not by improving its capacity to 
reason or critically reason, which are already divinely constructed perfect capacities. 
Rather, the human mind acquires certain knowledge by carefully attending to itself and 
focusing solely on using its rational powers to the fullest. Descartes articulates this point in 
the Second Set of Replies, where he says that the Meditations are written in what he calls 
the “analytic” style of exposition: 
Analysis shows the true way by means of which the thing in question was discovered 
methodically and as it were a priori, so that if the reader is willing to follow it and 
give sufficient attention to all points, he will make the thing his own and understand 
it just as perfectly as if he had discovered it for himself. But this method contains 
nothing to compel belief in an argumentative or inattentive reader; for if he fails to 
attend even to the smallest point, he will not see the necessity of the conclusion. (AT 
VII 155-156; CSMK 2:110) 
 
In his view, this is the style of thinking used by ancient mathematicians when they made 
great discoveries in geometry (AT VII 156; CSMK 2:111). As a practitioner of the analytic 
method, the meditator enters the project of doubt by giving his first-order beliefs his 
undivided attention and critically reviewing them as meticulously as is humanly possible. 
Descartes even says that anyone engaging in the method of doubt should “devote several 
months, or at least weeks” to the skeptical arguments before going on to seek positive 
knowledge (AT VII 130; CSMK 2:94).  
So, a true imitation of the meditator’s method of doubt requires more than being a 
critical reasoner or even critically reasoning with the rigorous norm of doubt. One must 
also think about one’s mental life with complete attention and uninterrupted thought. While 





even obligated to since we are all responsible for attaining certainty and wisdom, only those 







Chapter Three: The Cogito is an Argument  
In the last two chapters, I presented evidence that, in the Meditations, the meditator does in 
fact draw the kind of argument that is suggested by the line “I think, therefore I am.” 
Surprisingly, as early as the first meditation, the meditator judges that he thinks—he makes 
second-order judgments pertaining to the method of doubt. These second-order judgments 
about his first-order thoughts are essential to the method of doubt, and the meditator 
regards each second-order judgment as a premise he can use in his argument for sum. 
Moreover, the meditator has available a transcendental argument to vindicate the certainty 
of these second-order judgments. Their certainty follows from his capacity and 
responsibility to engage in the method of doubt.  
However, in the Objections and Replies and in his recorded Conversation with 
Burman, Descartes makes a series of detailed and complex remarks that are prima facie in 
tension with an understanding of the cogito as an argument. If Descartes regarded the 
meditator as not arguing for sum, but establishing sum some other way, then my naïve 
interpretation, which reads the meditator as arguing from cogito to sum, is false. 
In this chapter, I will begin to introduce these three remarks by exploring two ways 
that commentators have taken a sentence of the first remark to be in tension with an 
understanding of the meditator as arguing from cogito to sum. Appreciating the potential 
tensions will motivate a comprehensive scrutiny of the three remarks. 
 Common to the remarks is a discussion of whether Descartes uses “syllogistic” 
reasoning to establish sum in the Meditations. The first remark appears in the Replies to the 
Second Objections. Of the numerous features of Descartes’ first remark, including apparent 





When someone says 'I am thinking, therefore I am, or I exist', he does not deduce 
existence from thought by means of a syllogism, but recognizes it as something self-
evident by a simple intuition of the mind. (AT VII 140; CSMK 2:100) 
 
The second and third remarks, if read quickly, may be thought to contain similar denials to 
the first remark (I will soon argue, among other things, that this is a misreading). Now, if 
by “syllogism”, Descartes means argument, then the above passage contradicts my naïve 
interpretation of the Meditations. Hintikka reads the denial in this way: “…Since [cogito] is 
not just a premise from which the conclusion sum is deduced, the relation of the two 
becomes a problem.” (5, my emphasis).  
There is a second, more specific, way that the denial in the Second Replies might be 
read as creating a tension in Descartes’ writings. It might be read as accepting that “I think, 
therefore I am” expresses an argument, while denying that the argument relies on a general 
premise such as “Whatever thinks exists.” In this way, the denial seems to contradict 
Descartes’ other remarks where he appears to say that the argument expressed by the 
famous line does rely on a general premise in addition to cogito. 
  The young theologian Frans Burman is plausibly read as articulating this tension in 
his documented conversation with Descartes.48 Burman (AT V 147; CSMK 3:333) quotes 
the denial from the Second Replies and claims that Descartes “asserts the opposite” of the 
denial in the Principles, Part I, Article 10. Burman doesn’t say where in Article 10 
Descartes asserts the opposite of the denial from the Second Replies, or explain the conflict 
                                                      
48 Following scholars such as Bernard Williams and Harry Frankfurt, I will bracket 
questions regarding the textual accuracy of the record we have with Descartes’ 
Conversation with Burman. I assume the text as Descartes’ word. I refer a reader concerned 
with questions about the legitimacy of the text to Cottingham’s 1976 translation and 
commentary, the first English translation of the conversation. Cottingham examines the 





in any way. Let us see how these passages might contradict one another. Below is Article 
10. I have italicized the line Burman is most plausibly referring to. For some context, in the 
Principles Descartes first asserts “I think, therefore I am” in Article 7 of Part I; Article 10 
might be read as clarifying Article 7. 
10. Matters which are very simple and self-evident are only rendered more obscure 
by logical definitions, and should not be counted as items of knowledge which it 
takes effort to acquire. 
 
I shall not here explain many of the other terms which I have already used or will use 
in what follows, because they seem to me to be sufficiently self-evident. I have often 
noticed that philosophers make the mistake of employing logical definitions in an 
attempt to explain what was already very simple and self-evident; the result is that 
they only make matters more obscure. And when I said that the proposition I am 
thinking, therefore I exist is the first and most certain of all to occur to anyone who 
philosophizes in an orderly way, I did not in saying that deny that one must first know 
what thought, existence and certainty are, and that it is impossible that that which 
thinks should not exist, and so forth. But because these are very simple notions, and 
ones which on their own provide us with no knowledge of anything that exists, I did 
not think they needed to be listed. (AT VIII 7; CSMK 1:194-195) 
 
This seems to suggest that, to establish sum, one must know that “it is impossible that that 
which thinks should not exist.” Assuming that the italicized claim “it is impossible that that 
which thinks should not exist” is semantically equivalent to “whatever thinks exists,” it’s 
straightforward how Burman took Article 10 to be in tension with the denial Descartes 
makes in the Second Replies. Namely, Article 10 asserts that the cogito argument requires 
the premise “Whatever thinks exists”, while the denial from the Second Replies denies that 
the cogito argument requires that premise. In his response to Burman, Descartes seems to 
regard Burman as articulating the tension between the Second Replies and the Principles in 
this way (which is entirely resolvable, in Descartes’ view).49  
                                                      
49 See Cottingham (xx-xxii) for a longer argument in support of this way of framing the 





 We have seen two ways in which Descartes’ denial that sum is established by means 
of syllogism is in tension with an understanding of Descartes as establishing his existence 
by making an argument. One way is that the denial rejects an understanding of the cogito, 
like that suggested by the naïve interpretation, where it is an argument. The denial should 
be taken this way if Descartes uses the term “syllogism” to mean an argument. A subtler 
conflict is that the denial is in tension with an understanding of the way in which Descartes 
elsewhere seems to suggest that “I think” must be combined with the supporting premise 
“Whatever thinks exists” to successfully establish “I exist.” In the remainder of this section, 
I will argue that these two tensions dissolve on a close analysis of Descartes’ remarks, the 
first from the Second Replies, the second from the Appendix to the Fifth Replies, and the 
third from his Conversation with Burman. More specifically, my analysis will argue for the 
following three theses. 
First, against the first tension, Descartes doesn’t deny that one can deploy an 
argument for sum anywhere in the remarks. Rather, the denial in the Second Replies 
specifies the type of psychological procedure—the kind of reasoning—one must use to 
successfully argue from cogito to sum. Namely, to discover sum by arguing from cogito, 
one must reason from cogito to sum by “intuition” rather than by “deduction” or 
“syllogism.” Descartes distinguishes these three modes of reasoning in the Regulae, one of 
his earliest works. He is channeling the three-part distinction in the three remarks.  
Second, the chronological order of the remarks represents a shift in Descartes’ 
thinking about whether sum can be discovered through syllogistic reasoning. By the time of 
his Conversation with Burman, Descartes becomes neutral about whether it is possible to 





Replies. While, Descartes becomes neutral regarding whether sum can be discovered by 
syllogism, he still holds, first, that discovering sum through syllogistic reasoning is liable to 
reasoning errors of which a discovery by intuition is immune, and, second, if sum could be 
discovered via syllogism, this would only occur in exceptional cases involving a reasoner 
who is highly attentive and undistracted.  
Third, against the second tension, Descartes’ response to Burman clarifies that the 
passage from the Second Replies doesn’t deny that the cogito argument relies on the general 
premise “Whatever thinks exists” and so is not in conflict with Article 10 of the first section 
of the Principles. In fact, the Descartes’ Conversation with Burman shows that the most 
accurate representation of the cogito is an argument of the form:  
Whatever thinks exists. 
I think.  
Therefore, I exist. 
 
Furthermore, that the cogito argument is best represented as this argument, which 
exemplifies the Barbara form, one of the four forms documented in Aristotle’s theory of 
syllogism, doesn’t imply, for Descartes, that sum must be reasoned to syllogistically.  
 Let us now examine in full the three remarks in which Descartes discusses his views 
about syllogistic reasoning and their connection to the cogito. The three remarks can be 
chronologically ordered with the remark beginning with the Second Replies, followed by 
the remark from the Appendix to the Fifth Objections, and finishing with the Conversation 
with Burman.50  
                                                      
50 The Second Objection and Replies was published along with the first Latin edition of the 
Meditations in 1641. The Appendix to the Fifth Set of Objections came into circulation 
when it was affixed to the Objections and Replies for the publication of the first French 
edition in 1647, but could have been written as early as 1644 (see the first footnote on AT 





The first remark is from the Second Replies. 
Thirdly, when I said that we can know nothing for certain until we are aware that God 
exists, I expressly declared that I was speaking only of knowledge of those 
conclusions which can be recalled when we are no longer attending to the arguments 
by means of which we deduced them. Now awareness of first principles is not 
normally called 'knowledge' by dialectitians. And when we become aware that we are 
thinking things, this is a primary notion which is not derived by means of any 
syllogism. When someone says 'I am thinking, therefore I am, or I exist', he does not 
deduce existence from thought by means of a syllogism, but recognizes it as 
something self-evident by a simple intuition of the mind. This is clear from the fact 
that if he were deducing it by means of a syllogism, he would have to have had 
previous knowledge of the major premiss 'Everything which thinks is, or exists'; yet 
in fact he learns it from experiencing in his own case that it is impossible that he 
should think without existing. It is in the nature of our mind to construct general 
propositions on the basis of our knowledge of particular ones. (AT VII 140-141; 
CSMK 100-101) 
 
The second remark appears in the Appendix to Fifth Objections and Replies. 
 
Your friends note six objections against the Second Meditations. The first is this. The 
author of the Counter-Objections claims that when I say ‘I am thinking, therefore I 
exist’ I presuppose the major premiss ‘Whatever thinks exist’, and hence I have 
already adopted a preconceived opinion. Here he once more misuses the term 
‘preconceived opinion’. For although we can apply the term to the proposition in 
question when it is put forward without attention and believed to be true previously, 
we cannot say that it is always a preconceived opinion. For when we examine it, it 
appears so evident to the understanding that we cannot but believe it, even though 
this may be the first time in our life that we have thought of it—in which case we 
would have no preconceived opinion. But the most important mistake our critic 
makes here is the supposition that knowledge of particular propositions must always 
be deduced from universal ones, following the same order as that of a syllogism in 
Dialectic (footnote: by ‘Dialectic’ Descartes means scholastic logic.) Here he shows 
how little he knows in the way in which we should search for the truth. It is certain 
that if we are to discover the truth we must always begin with particular notions in 
order to arrive at the general ones later on (though we may also reverse the order and 
deduce other particular truths once we have discovered general ones). Thus when we 
teach a child the elements of geometry we will not be able to get him to understand 
the general proposition ‘When equal quantities are taken from equal amounts the 
remaining amounts will be equal’ or ‘The whole is greater than its parts’, (footnote: 
These are two of the ‘Axioms’ which appear at the start of Euclid’s Elements of 
Geometry) unless we show him examples in particular cases. It is by failing to take 
heed of this that our author has gone astray and produced all the invalid arguments 
with which he has stuffed his book. He has simply made up false major premisses 
whenever the mood takes him, as though I had used them to deduce the truths which I 






The third remark is Descartes’ response to Burman, who complains that Article 10 
of Part 1 of the Principles asserts the opposite of the denial in the first remark. Descartes 
replies: 
Before this inference, ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist’, the major ‘whatever thinks 
exists’ can be known; for it is in reality prior to my inference, and my inference 
depends on it. That is why the author says in the Principles that the major premiss 
comes first, namely because implicitly it is always presupposed and prior. But it does 
not follow that I am always expressly and explicitly aware of its priority, or that I 
know it before my inference. This is because I am attending only to what I experience 
within myself—for example ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist’. I do not pay attention 
in the same way to the general notion ‘whatever thinks exists’. As I have explained 
before, we do not separate out these general propositions from particular instances; 
rather, it is in the particular instances that we think of them. This, then, is the sense in 
which the words cited here should be taken. (AT V 147; CSMK 3:333) 
 
Let us cover some basic interpretive points that arise in the first remark. Then we 
will work up to the second two remarks, considering how they expand on and depart from 
the first remark. The central point Descartes makes in the first remark is the denial already 
introduced; that when someone says, “I think, therefore I am,” she recognizes her existence 
through intuition and doesn’t deduce it by means of a syllogism.  
The only work in which Descartes distinguishes these kinds of reasoning—intuition, 
deduction, and syllogistic reasoning—is the Regulae. Thus, any interpretation of the just-
quoted remarks must begin with the Regulae. The full title of the Regulae is translated as 
“Rules for the Direction of the Mind.” Fittingly, the work is a series of rules for reasoning 
that, if followed with scrupulous care, will supposedly lead a rational person to discover 
true and certain conclusions across a breadth of domains: philosophy, arithmetic, geometry, 
and possibly more.  
In distinguishing intuition, deduction, and syllogistic reasoning, Descartes’ intention 





that will serve as the basis for a method to make us better thinkers. What he is not doing is 
creating three different logical vocabularies in which certain chains of vocabulary make up 
valid arguments and others do not, in the way that modal logic features different logical 
vocabulary and valid arguments than propositional logic. Rather, Descartes is interested in 
what the human mind does when it reasons. More specifically, first, he is interested in the 
psychological methods that a thinker can use to move from the premise(s) to the conclusion 
of an argument. Second, he is interested particularly in different ways to reason to 
conclusions where we discover something new. That is, reasoning where we draw a 
conclusion about some matter we haven’t decided on before. Third, he is interested in what 
is psychologically responsible for reasoning that leads to very good outcomes: new 
conclusions that are true and certain (AT X 366-370; CSMK 1:13-15). 
Descartes introduces intuition and deduction as two reasoning processes that “arrive 
at a knowledge of things with no fear of being mistaken” (AT X 368; CSMK 1:14). 
Reasoning by intuition leaves “no room for doubt about what we are understanding” (ibid). 
Reasoning by intuition involves having a clear and distinct perception that “the original 
proposition follows necessarily from the [premises].” In addition, whatever we intuit is 
certain (if something is uncertain, it either has not or cannot be intuited). One example 
Descartes gives of a conclusion we can discover via intuitive reasoning is “3+1=2+2.” By 
considering the two propositions “3+1=4” and “2+2=4”, one can intuit the proposition 
“3+1=2+2.”  
While Descartes uses his concept of intuition to explain what happens in the mind 
when we draw logical consequences, this is an explanation of logical consequences we 





370; CSMK 1:14-15). So, intuition is a way of reasoning through arguments that don’t have 
many premises (whether an argument can be intuited that has many premises—say more 
than two or three—might vary from one person to the next: compare the child learning 
arithmetic to the professional mathematician). For arguments that have more premises—
arguments with “remote” conclusions, as Descartes calls them—we use deduction. 
Deduction is a psychological process that is defined partly in terms of intuition. When we 
deduce a conclusion from premises, we make a series of intuitions between premises to 
intermediary conclusions, and so on, in “a continuous and uninterrupted movement of 
thought” until we draw the main conclusion (ibid). As with intuition, in deduction we form 
certain beliefs in the conclusion of our reasoning. Yet, the certainty we attain through 
deduction requires remembering the sequence of intuitions that you have completed.  
To illustrate how it takes more for the deduced conclusions to be certain than for the 
intuited ones to be certain, consider two chain link fences: one ten feet long and a second 
fence stretching out of sight. It’s reasonable to be very confident that all the links in the ten-
foot fence are connected because you can see all its links in one glance. But to reasonably 
be very confident that the extended fence is linked up, more is required. You must walk its 
length, stop at multiple places to make note of the links, and make a point to remember 
each stop. So, while intuition and deduction both lead to certainty and cannot be mistaken, 
intuition is instantaneous and requires nothing more than the clear and distinct perception 
of very few premises and the conclusion. In deduction, which involves many premises, 
more is required for certainty. An argument must be reasoned though over time in a 
continuous series of intuitions, and each step of the argument must be preserved in 





To best appreciate the significance of Descartes’ denial that the cogito is a 
syllogism, it will be helpful to further explore Descartes’ contrast between syllogistic 
reasoning with intuition (and deduction, since deduction, on Descartes’ theory of reasoning, 
requires a series of intuitions). In the Regulae, Descartes appears to contrast syllogistic 
reasoning and intuition as two styles of reasoning associated with different accounts of 
logical consequence. He says that the dialecticians, who teach Aristotle’s theory of 
syllogism to their students:  
prescribe certain forms of reasoning in which the conclusions follow with such 
irresistible necessity that if our reason relies on them, even though it takes, as it were, 
a rest from considering a particular inference clearly and attentively, it can 
nevertheless draw a conclusion which is certain simply in virtue of the form. (AT X 
405-406; CSMK 1:36) 
 
Descartes goes on to critique the dialecticians.51 But, before doing so, in this passage he is 
plausibly read as attributing to the theory of syllogistic reasoning an account of logical 
consequence. Perhaps Descartes thought along the following lines. According to the 
dialecticians, an argument or inference is valid (or, less technically, “good”) when reason 
identifies it as having one of the twenty-four accepted forms of argument set down in the 
                                                      
51 When Descartes uses the term “syllogism” or “syllogism in Dialectic”, he is referring to 
the study of logic that was prominent in medieval scholastic schools (the “logic of the 
Schools” as he calls it in the preface of the Principles). This late medieval logic largely 
accepted Aristotle’s theory of syllogism as detailed in the Prior Analytics. While medieval 
logicians expanded on some of Aristotle’s syllogisms for modal sentences, those having to 
do with possibility, Aristotle’s syllogisms for non-modal sentences were with little 
exception treated as a definitive science of valid reasoning. Aristotle’s theory of syllogism 
developed a system to identify twenty-four valid forms of three-line arguments or 
“syllogisms” out of two-hundred fifty-six possible arguments forms. The theory of 
syllogism was not just seen as a scientific accomplishment, but as something that could be 
taught to make people think better. Like the critical thinking courses that are taught to 
undergraduates today, in the late middle ages there was a pedagogy called “dialectic” which 
centered on the idea that students could ameliorate their reasoning skills by learning to use 





theory of syllogism. By contrast, when we use intuition, a good argument is understood 
using Descartes’ in-house notion of clarity and distinctness. An argument is valid when 
reason clearly and attentively (or “distinctly”, as Descartes might have later said) perceives 
that the conclusion follows from the premises in this particular argument (rather than in 
some larger class of arguments to which the argument under consideration is a member).  
  It should be clear at this point that Descartes’ denial from the Second Replies 
doesn’t imply that he thought he could establish his existence using some non-
argumentative, non-inferential strategy—that the relation of cogito to sum is not one of 
premise to conclusion. The denial sheds light on the method of reasoning the meditator uses 
to infer sum: he did so intuitively. Based on Descartes’ account of intuitive reasoning, this 
means that the meditator used his reason to look at the argument as he formulated it in his 
own case (rather than being a member of some larger class of arguments defined by their 
formal properties). When his reason checked out the argument, he clearly and distinctly 
perceived that cogito entails sum (again, instead of perhaps clearly and distinctly seeing the 
argument in his own case as being a member of a larger class of valid arguments in virtue 
of shared formal properties).52  
                                                      
52 Why does Descartes think that cogito entails sum—why is it true that if I think, then I 
exist? Descartes may be read as appealing to clarity and distinctness for the answer. Since I 
can clearly and distinctly perceive that my existence is a necessary condition for my 
thinking, I have the strongest possible reason to believe that the entailment holds. 
(“Perception” here is not sensory but some sort of rational or purely intellectual perception, 
however obscure that may be). In the Principles, Descartes explains that cogito entails sum 
because “it is a contradiction to suppose that what thinks does not, at the very time when it 
is thinking, exist” (AT VIII 7; CSMK 1:194). Here, Descartes is suggesting that the 
entailment can be shown by a reductio ad absurdum argument. When it’s assumed that 
cogito doesn’t entail sum, it follows that it’s possible for someone to think who doesn’t 
exist. That is a contradiction. So, the initial assumption—that cogito doesn’t entail sum—is 
false. Therefore, cogito does entail sum. I leave it an open question whether these two 





 Having clarified the meaning of Descartes’ denial that sum was arrived at 
syllogistically, our next task is to examine Descartes’ rationale behind the denial. The first 
point to consider is that, compared to the first remark from the Second Replies containing 
the denial, in the latter two remarks Descartes progressively softens the denial. In the 
second, he only goes so far to say that Gassendi was mistaken to think that sum “must 
always” be arrived at through syllogism. He also concedes that sum can be derived through 
syllogism after sum has been discovered by intuition. In the third remark, Descartes never 
overtly mentions syllogistic reasoning, even though he is responding to the apparent 
tension, framed by Burman, between the Principles and the denial in the Second Replies, 
and in the latter Descartes explicitly refers to syllogistic reasoning.  
In the next several pages, I will argue that in the third remark Descartes retracts his 
denial that sum is inferred syllogistically. In the end, he becomes neutral about whether we 
can discover sum through syllogistic reasoning. However, he continues to maintain that 
establishing sum via syllogistic reasoning would not be easy, psychologically speaking, to 
do—it’s much easier for us to discover sum, and be certain of our discovery, by intuition. 
To advance this claim, I will argue that Descartes’ retraction of the denial in the Second 
Replies stems from a shift in his objections against the view that syllogistic reasoning can 
be used to discover new truths.  
I will start by discussing a strong objection Descartes issues in the first remark that 
it’s impossible to discover sum by reasoning syllogistically. There, Descartes says that the 
                                                      
perceive the entailment, and that it’s contradictory to deny the entailment—are really 
separate answers. It could be that Descartes’ view is that to clearly and distinctly perceive 






reason why sum is not inferred by syllogism is that, to have done so, he would have to 
previously known the major premise “Everything that thinks exists.” But to have previously 
known that and not yet have known sum is incompatible: it would be impossible for there 
to be a time that Descartes, on the one hand, knew that everything that thinks exists, but, on 
the other hand, didn’t know that he exists. Descartes thinks that the dialecticians who think 
that sum can be discovered syllogistically fall into the error of endorsing something that is 
impossible—that an individual can know the general premise and at the same time not 
know “I exist.”    
Descartes, here, is recasting a more general objection leveled towards syllogistic 
reasoning that he states in the Regulae. The objection is that it’s impossible to use 
syllogistic reasoning of the form “All X are A. S is an X. Therefore, S is A” to discover 
new knowledge: 
Dialecticians are unable to formulate a syllogism with a true conclusion unless they 
are already in possession of the substance of the conclusion, i.e. unless they have 
previous knowledge of the very truth deduced in the syllogism. It is obvious therefore 
that they themselves can learn nothing new from such forms of reasoning, and hence 
that ordinary dialectic is of no use whatever to those who wish to investigate the truth 
of things. Its sole advantage is that it sometimes enables us to explain to others 
arguments which are already known. It should therefore be transferred from 
philosophy to rhetoric. (AT X 406; CSMK 1:36-37). 
 
The objection applies only to certain arguments whose form exemplifies the Barbara form  
 
of syllogism, like the classic: 
 
All men are mortal. 
Socrates is a man. 
Therefore, Socrates is mortal. 
 
The apparent problem is that, if, say, I’m not sure whether Socrates is mortal, it would be 
impossible for me to discover this fact about Socrates by reasoning via syllogism from two 





wouldn’t have discovered anything new. Since I already knew that all men are mortal, I 
also knew, at that same time—by that “All men are mortal” premise alone!—that Socrates 
is mortal. Socrates, after all, is a member of the class of all men. The same objection 
applies to a formulation of the cogito as:  
Whatever thinks exists. 
I think. 
Therefore, I exist. 
 
The objection is not that the argument is invalid. It’s that someone who issues such an 
argument and knows that the general premise is true could never genuinely discover the 
conclusion as a fact not previously known.  
The cogency of Descartes’ objection depends on the view that to know general 
claims like the major premises “Whatever thinks exists” or “All men are mortal”, one must 
have extensive knowledge of particulars. Consider some potential requirements for 
knowing general claims. First, to know a general claim, one must know of (or be 
acquainted with) all the particulars that are members of the class described by the subject 
of the general claim (for example, thinkers and men, respectively). Second, of each of these 
particulars that one knows of, or is acquainted with, one must know that the particular has 
the thing which the general claim attributes (existence and mortality, respectively). With 
these two requirements on knowledge of general claims in place, Descartes’ objection 
appears to carry weight. For, from these requirements, when I know “whatever thinks 
exists,” I’m acquainted with myself, since I’m one of the thinkers, and, moreover, I know 
that I’m one of the thinkers that exists since existence is what is being attributed in the 
general claim. In other words, with these requirements, I already know that I exist. The 





reasoning since such reasoning requires one to know “Whatever thinks exists,” and 
whenever this is known by the individual doing the syllogistic reasoning, that individual 
already knows that she exists.  
In fact, in the first and second remarks Descartes looks like he is making a 
requirement on knowledge of general claims similar to those mentioned in the above 
paragraph. In the first he says, “It is in the nature of our mind to construct general 
propositions on the basis of our knowledge of particular ones.” He comes close to restating 
the point in the second remark with the example of the boy learning geometry. The boy 
cannot “learn” the general claims that make up the axioms of Euclid’s geometry “unless we 
show him examples in particular cases.” Given Descartes’ views that we “learn” and 
“construct” general claims only by first examining particulars, it’s plausible that Descartes, 
at the time he made the first and second remarks, accepted the requirement that, to know a 
general claim, one must have substantial knowledge of all the particulars that are in the 
class discussed in the subject of the general claim. The presence of such a requirement in 
the first two remarks, which justifies the strong objection against syllogistic reasoning we 
have been discussing from the Regulae, lends further coherence to the view that Descartes, 
at the time of writing the first and second remarks, did endorse the strong objection.  
In the second remark, Descartes qualifies his strong objection against syllogistic 
reasoning. His parenthetical comment that “we may also reverse the order and deduce other 
particular truths once we have discovered general ones” allows that sum can be soundly 
derived from “Whatever thinks exists” and “I think”, just not discovered. So, Descartes’ 
remark clarifies that he is only rejecting the idea that syllogistic reasoning can lead to 





new truths. This position echoes his comment in the passage from the Regulae, already 
cited, that the syllogism does have the advantage of, in some sense, helping to “explain” 
what is already known (AT X 406; CSMK 1:36-37). 
 By the time of Descartes’ conversation with Burman, he no longer thought it was 
impossible to discover truths through syllogistic reasoning. I suggest that we should read 
Descartes by this time as neither accepting nor rejecting that sum might be discovered by 
syllogistic reasoning. The three pieces of evidence from Descartes’ Conversation with 
Burman that are jointly sufficient to attribute this neutral position are: 
(1) That he omits to state the strong objection that syllogistic discovery is impossible.  
(2) That he modifies his previous view that we learn general claims by first knowing 
particulars in a way that fails to adequately support the strong objection. 
(3) That he explicitly endorses another objection that syllogistic reasoning makes 
discovery psychologically challenging (but not impossible), which is compatible 
with the view that syllogistic reasoning can lead to the discovery of certain truths.  
 
Let us take up each piece of evidence one at a time.  
First, nowhere in Descartes’ response to Burman does he deny that sum can be 
discovered syllogistically. In fact, he doesn’t even use the words “syllogism” or advert to 
the dialecticians in his response. Nor does Descartes say that it’s impossible to know 
“Whatever thinks exists” without also knowing “I exist.” Thus, Descartes makes no 
reference to the strong objection.  
Second, more than just omitting to mention the strong objection that he endorses in 
the first and second remarks, Descartes, in his response to Burman, makes several claims 
that are in tension with the strong objection. He says that the general claim can in fact be 
known before one infers sum, although one need not know it to discover sum. Also, he no 
longer states a view about how we learn general claims that implies that we must have 





knowledge of general claims that makes the strong objection tenable. His revised view is 
that “we do not separate out these general propositions from particular instances; rather, it 
is in the particular instances that we think of them.” It’s hard to make out exactly what this 
amounts to. The claim is too weak to entail the requirement that to know a general claim, 
one must know of all the particulars that are members of the subject of the general claim. 
Thus, Descartes lacks the justification he needs to mount the strong objection that discovery 
cannot be made via syllogism. 
Third, in the Conversation with Burman, Descartes only explicitly endorses an 
objection that reasoning via syllogism is less likely to lead to discovery. This position, 
when coupled with the above evidence that he no longer avowed the strong objection that 
syllogistic discovery is impossible, is evidence that Descartes at this point doesn’t disavow 
the view that in rare cases one could discover sum via syllogism.  
Elsewhere in Descartes’ conversation with Burman, Descartes commits to an 
objection against syllogistic discovery other than the one we have been discussing. At one 
juncture, Burman quotes (without any documented context) a passage from the Discourse 
on Method where Descartes says, “I observed with regard to logic that syllogisms and most 
of its other techniques are of less use for learning things than for explaining to others the 
things that one already knows” (AT VI 17; CSMK 1:119). Descartes, presumably offering 
clarification about what he meant in the passage, says to Burman: 
This really applies not so much to logic, which provides demonstrative proofs on all 
subjects, but to dialectic, which teaches us how to hold forth on all subjects. In this 
way it undermines good sense, rather than building on it. For in diverting attention 
and making us digress into the stock arguments and headings, which are irrelevant to 
the thing under discussion, it diverts us from the actual nature of the thing itself… 






On this objection, syllogistic reasoning is less likely to lead to discovery. The objection is 
that since syllogistic reasoning emphasizes attending to the form of an argument rather than 
the “actual nature” of what we are trying to discover, the prospects for discovery via 
syllogistic reasoning are poor.  
This objection that syllogistic reasoning encourages reason to attend to properties of 
arguments that are less conducive to discovering truth also traces its development in 
Descartes’ works back to the Regulae. There, Descartes warns that when we follow the 
dialectician’s advice of reasoning using syllogisms, we risk “reason’s taking a holiday” 
when we concentrate on the form of the argument before us and whether its form 
corresponds to one of the twenty-four valid forms of argument, instead of considering “the 
particular inference clearly and attentively” (AT X 406; CSMK 1:36, my emphasis). In 
another place in the Regulae, Descartes says that the formal properties of an argument 
which we attend to in syllogistic reasoning make the procedure a “positive hindrance” on 
the finding new truths (AT X 373; CSMK 1:16) in which “truth slips through these fetters” 
(AT X 406; CSMK 1:36).  
Once this objection that reasoning by syllogism can distract us is prized apart from 
what I have called the “strong objection”, we will see that the objection from distraction is 
by itself compatible with the possibility of rare discovery through syllogism. The strong 
objection is that syllogistic discovery using the Barbara form is impossible since 
knowledge of the general claim (All X’s are F) requires knowledge of the conclusion that 
one is trying to reach (S is an F). By contrast, the objection we are now considering applies 





Yet, the objection doesn’t offer a reason why, in principle, syllogistic reasoning 
cannot lead to discovery. The issue that the objection from distraction brings out is that 
when we engage in syllogistic reasoning, we must assiduously analyze the form of the 
argument whose validity is in question and compare its form to a very complicated system 
of argument forms. When we do this, we might make mistakes in all sorts of ways—for 
example, by misanalysing the form of the argument we are considering, or, while analyzing 
it correctly, failing to correctly match our argument to the general argument form it 
exemplifies (of the 256 total forms). These procedures, essential to syllogistic reasoning, 
open us up to error, and so can be thought of as a distracting us from making accurate 
judgments about whether an argument is valid, which in turn hampers us from discovering 
true conclusions through reasoning. However, thus described, the objection from distraction 
doesn’t maintain that it’s impossible (even psychologically speaking) for someone—a 
really careful person who keeps all her marbles straight—to genuinely discover sum. 
Discovering sum would require, first, being certain of the premises “Whatever thinks 
exists” and “I think”, and, second, correctly identifying that these premises, along with the 
conclusion “I exist”, compose an argument that exemplifies one of the valid forms of 
argument in the theory of syllogism. Doing that is hard, and Descartes thinks it’s much 
easier to intuit sum from attending only to cogito and what it entails. But by his talk with 
Burman he doesn’t seem to think that it’s impossible to discover sum by syllogistic 
reasoning. 
What I have argued over the last several pages is that Descartes’ view about 
whether it’s possible to discover one’s existence using a syllogistic inference changed 





view that it’s impossible to discover that he exists via syllogistic reasoning. However, by 
the time he wrote what we know as his final written word on the subject, his Conversation 
with Burman, Descartes’ view had changed. At the end, he is neutral about discovering sum 
by syllogistic reasoning. How Descartes’ comes down on the issue of whether sum can be 
discovered via syllogism doesn’t affect the tenability of the naïve interpretation of the 
cogito. Still, if syllogistic discovery could occur, Descartes would hold that it would only 
occur in exceptional circumstances in which a reasoner is especially skilled at deploying 
the theory of syllogism. Descartes’ change in view resulted from his dropping the stronger 
of two separate objections against the possibility of syllogistic discovery, both of which he 
avowed in his earliest writings.  
I have not identified textual evidence that sufficiently explains why Descartes no 
longer avowed the strong objection that syllogistic discovery is impossible. I have argued 
that there is textual evidence that Descartes jettisoned the strong objection because he 
revised his views about what is required to know a general claim like “Whatever thinks 
exists” or “All men are mortal.” At the publication of the Meditations, Descartes thought 
we “learn” general propositions “on the basis of our knowledge of particular ones” (AT VII 
140-141; CSMK 100-101), which entails that one must know of particular thinkers or men 
to know the mentioned general claims. Furthermore, for Descartes to adequately justify the 
objection that syllogistic discovery is impossible, the requirement on knowing general 
claims must be even stronger. It must be that to know the general claim “All men are 
mortal”, one is required to know of all the particular men and whether each man is mortal 
or not. However, by the time of Descartes’ Conversation with Burman, he only thought that 





particular instances.” This claim does not seem to entail the requirements for knowing 
general claims necessary to support the strong objection against syllogistic discovery.  
But why did Descartes no longer think that we learn general claims on the basis of 
our knowledge of particular claims? I have not found textual evidence to explain this 
change in Descartes’ position, a change that in turn explains why Descartes no longer 
accepted the strong objection against syllogistic discovery. The view that we learn general 
claims on the basis of our knowledge of particulars seems to have problems. Surely, in 
some cases, knowledge of particulars is required for knowledge of the general claim. I ask 
my little cousin Simon if all the flowers in the garden are peonies. He must examine each 
flower in the garden to know the answer.  
However, when it comes to general claims like “All men are mortal,” some might 
find it plausible that all I need to do is analyze what “man” means to know that all men are 
mortal. And analyzing the concept “man” doesn’t involve thinking about, or knowing, a 
particular man. Indeed, it might be a fact about the human mind that we usually imagine a 
particular man—perhaps Socrates, your brother, or Al Capone—when we consider the 
concept “man.” And this fact may be what Descartes is getting at when he says to Burman 
“we do not separate out these general propositions from particular instances; rather, it is in 
the particular instances that we think of them.” Still, to imagine a man is not to know him. 
It may be plausible that to know a general claim like “all men are mortal”, all that is 
required is analyzing the concept (which might involve imagining, but not knowing, a 
particular instance of the concept). Perhaps by his Conversation with Burman, Descartes 





Another problem with the requirement that one must know particulars to know a 
general claim is that such a requirement may lead to skepticism about many general claims 
we purport to know. On a view according to which no particular numbers exist, the 
requirement entails that we cannot know general claims in mathematics such as “the sum of 
two prime numbers is an even number.” To the extent that we should reject views that 
imply skepticism about mathematical knowledge (and maintain the view that no particular 
numbers exist), we should reject the view that knowledge of particulars is required for 
general knowledge.  
Still, I leave it an open question why Descartes softened his requirements on having 
knowledge of general claims, though I have just presented two reasons why one might do 
so. 
The way I read the three remarks as a progression of Descartes’ thoughts on 
whether sum can be discovered syllogistically runs counter to the interpretations of several 
commentators. For example, Margaret Wilson (56), Harry Frankfurt (98), and Bernard 
Williams (73-76) each note some differences between Descartes’ Conversation with 
Burman and the two remarks from the Objections and Replies, although they don’t consider 
the possibility that Descartes’ Conversation with Burman represents a change in his views 
about the possibility of syllogistic discovery. Neither do these three commentators explore 
Descartes’ three remarks in connection to Descartes’ account of syllogistic reasoning in the 
Regulae and the objections found within that text against the possibility of syllogistic 
discovery.  
Without digressing much further into the secondary literature, I wish to draw one 





reasoning and the cogito and those interpretations of other commentators. I don’t think that 
Descartes thought that if someone were to rely on the general claim “whatever thinks 
exists” in reasoning to sum for the first time, doing so would entail that they discovered 
sum via syllogistic reasoning.53 In Bernard Williams’s discussion of the cogito, he refers to 
the general claim “whatever thinks exists” as “the syllogistic premiss” (75). Referring to the 
general premise this way might give one the impression that Descartes believed that relying 
on the general premise in one’s argument for sum is tantamount to syllogistic reasoning. 
This is not so, as I have explained. By “syllogism” Descartes was referring to a theory of 
proper argument forms. Descartes also used the term to refer to a psychological process of 
reasoning connected to this theory of valid argument forms. This process involves 
identifying the form of the particular argument whose validity is in question and checking 
that form against the proper forms licensed by the theory of syllogism. 
Moreover, calling the general claim a syllogistic premise doesn’t sit well with 
Descartes’ comments in his Conversation with Burman. There, Descartes says that the 
general claim “Whatever thinks exists” is “always…prior” to sum and the argument for sum 
“always presupposes” the general claim (AT V 147; CSMK 3:333, my italics). Now, as I 
have argued, while Descartes might have in the end become neutral regarding whether sum 
can be discovered syllogistically, he always held that sum can be discovered by intuition. 
So, the general claim is presupposed and “depended on” as a “major premiss” even when 
sum is discovered by intuition (ibid). For this reason, it’s misleading on Descartes’ use of 
the term “syllogism” to call the general claim a syllogistic premise. So, Descartes held that 
                                                      
53 My point applies whether “relied on” means either explicitly representing the general 
claim as a premise when formulating the argument in one’s mind, or just presupposing the 





Whatever thinks exists. 
I think. 
Therefore, I exist. 
 
is a valid argument with true premises, but not a “syllogistic” argument as such (in his 
view, that depends on whether someone who reasons through this argument compared its 
formal properties to those accepted by Aristotle’s theory of syllogism).  
Lastly, the conclusion of this argument can be discovered by intuition, even if the 
individual making the argument doesn’t consciously represent the general claim as a 
premise. As Descartes says, the general premise is relied on in the cogito argument even if 
one isn’t “expressly and explicitly aware of [the general claim’s] priority” (ibid). This 
appears to be the way the meditator reaches sum in the second meditation. While Descartes’ 
remark to Burman suggests that the meditator relies on the suppressed general premise 
“Whatever thinks exists” for the success of his argument for sum, the meditator proceeds in 
the second meditation as though he isn’t aware of a general premise in his argument. He 
concludes sum only by considering the certitude of his second-order judgment that he is 
thinking and his clear and distinct perception that his existence is a logical consequence 
from the fact that he has been thinking. The meditator doesn’t recognize that this logical 
consequence holds for all thinkers. For Descartes, this is entirely sufficient for the 








 This thesis has sought to defend a reading of the Meditations on which the 
meditator establishes with certainty that he exists by deriving this conclusion from the 
premise that he thinks. If this naïve interpretation of the Meditations is correct, Descartes 
has a uniform account of the cogito across his three most comprehensive philosophical 
works, the Meditations, the Discourse, and the Principles.  
 Although the naïve argument is simple and elegant, I hope to have shown that its 
presentation in the Meditations is quite complex. Compared to the Discourse and the 
Principles, where the naïve argument is deployed in one sentence, in the Meditations the 
argument transpires over the course of two meditations. Cogito, the premise, is asserted in 
the first meditation in the form of the meditator’s second-order judgments that are integral 
to his doubt. Then, in the second meditation, the meditator discovers that his existence 
follows from the fact that he thinks and subsequently concludes that he exists.  
 In contrast to the crisp presentations of the naïve argument in Descartes’ other 
works, its exposition in the Meditations may seem tedious. But I have striven to show that 
this presentation rewards the close reader with added philosophical detail. The assertion of 
cogito in the first meditation showcases the significance and necessity of second-order 
reflection in the meditator’s method of doubt. The assertion of certain second-order 
judgments also dispels the caricature that the first meditation is purely destructive and 
contains no certainty. In fact, the meditator must be certain of his own mental states to call 
his beliefs into question.  
We have also seen that the meditator can defend the certitude of cogito by using 





make an argument that appeals to his epistemic responsibility to doubt his beliefs and how 
this requires that he has certain self-knowledge about his own thoughts.  
 Moreover, we saw that Descartes’ discussion within the Objections and Replies and 
his Conversation with Burman clarify that the cogito is in fact an argument whose 
conclusion is inferred using a reasoning process Descartes calls “intuition.” The meditator 
himself intuits that his own existence is implied by the fact that he thinks. It’s plausible 
from Descartes’ discussion in the Regulae that to intuit something is equivalent to having a 
clear and distinct perception of that thing. As he puts it, to intuit an inferential connection 
between some premise and conclusion is to “clearly and attentively” consider that inference 
(AT X 405-406; CSMK 1:36). So, Descartes’ doctrine of clear and distinct perception also 
enters into the cogito. Once cogito is claimed as a premise, then, by clearly and distinctly 
perceiving that sum follows from cogito, one becomes certain that she exists. But cogito, 
the premise, is itself not clearly and distinctly perceived—only the entailment between the 
premise and conclusion.  
It’s also superfluous for the person reasoning through the naïve argument to 
recognize that the entailment from cogito to sum is an instance of a principle generalized to 
all thinkers such as “Whatever thinks exists.” This principle need not be represented as a 
premise by someone reasoning to sum. However, there is some possibility that Descartes 
became open to the view that a second alternative way of maneuvering through the 
inferential step of the cogito is to use syllogistic reasoning. In this case, the syllogistic 
reasoning would require that the reasoner recognizes the general principle “Whatever 
thinks exists” as an additional premise in the naïve argument. Recognition of this premise 





   My approach to this thesis has been to consider three basic challenges to reading 
the meditator as arguing from cogito to sum in the Meditations—that he never asserts 
cogito, lacks a defense of cogito, and denies ever making an argument from cogito to sum. 
If my project has succeeded, it has shown that, when one hews closely to the text of the 
Meditations, these challenges are more than surmountable: they are doorways, beyond 
which lie nuanced and possibly novel insights into one of the pithiest arguments in Western 
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